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Controversy continues over the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential 
leakers as critics argue that the technique is based on faulty assumptions. The purpose of 
this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine whether there was a 
perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of 
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year 
compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same 
time period. Paternoster and Simpson’s, as well as Vance and Siponen’s, rational choice 
models and Bandura’s social learning theory served as the theoretical foundation for this 
study. Specifically, this study assessed groups’ perceptions about adhering to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required, changes in their behavior and attitude, and beliefs 
about polygraph deterrent effect. Data were obtained through a 15-minute researcher- 
created survey with a cluster sample of 326 participants. Data were analyzed with a t test 
to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. A 
factor analysis was also conducted. Results indicated that there was a statistically 
significant difference (p < .001) between the groups, suggesting that participants perceive 
a deterrent effect associated with the use of polygraphs as well as a change of behavior 
and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work. The implications for 
positive social change stemming from this study include recommendations to the nation’s 
national security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of 
certain security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 The term, insider threats, refers to current or former employees, service providers, 
or contractors who are the greatest threat to an organization’s security management due to 
their possible noncompliance with security policies (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, 
& Boss, 2009; Holmlund, Mucisko, Kimberland, & Freyre, 2010; Holmlund, Mucisko, 
Lynch, & Freyre, 2011; Jenkins, 2013; Li, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2010). Insider threats can 
be divided into two categories: (a) nonmalicious and (b) malicious (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom 
& von Solms, 2004). Nonmalicious insider threats pertain to current and former 
employees, contractors, and other business partners who put their company at risk 
because they did not comply with the suggested security policy due to ignorance or 
nonmalicious negligence (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Examples of 
nonmalicious insider threats include disclosing sensitive information in e-mails or in 
conversations or visiting websites that are infected with viruses or malware (Holmlund et 
al., 2010; Jenkins, 2013). On the other hand, malicious insider threats pertain to 
employees, contractors, and other business partners who have authorized access to their 
organization’s network, system, and data, and intentionally exceeded or misused their 
access in a way that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization’s information or information systems (IS; Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team [CERT], 2015). Examples of malicious insider threats include stealing and 
exposing sensitive information, sabotaging systems, and committing financial fraud 
(Holmlund et al., 2010; Jenkins, 2013). 
 The health of U.S. companies is vital to the U.S. economy as the economy is a 
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matter of national security (Figliuzzi, 2012). Based on the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) pending case load during fiscal year 2012, Figliuzzi (2012), then 
assistant director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, reported that economic 
espionage losses to the U.S. economy totaled more than $13 billion (para. 1). Ponemon 
Institute (2011, p. 2) found that the average time to resolve a cyber attack is 18 days, 
which can cost an organization approximately $415,748. In contrast, Ponemon Institute 
reported that malicious insider cyber attacks can take more than 45 days to contain.  
Different techniques and strategies have been used to deter and detect insider 
threats, such as human behavioral analysis techniques (e.g., polygraph examinations) and 
detecting anomalies in system resource utilization (e.g., file access monitoring; Jenkins, 
2013; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2012). However, 
controversies still continue about the use of polygraph analysis to detect deception 
(Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some supporters argue that it is highly accurate, while some 
opponents argue that it is very unreliable (American Polygraph Association, 2005; 
Cumming, 2009; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). The National Research Council (2003) 
reported that little is known about whether polygraph screenings are effective in terms of 
deterring national security crimes. Therefore, in this descriptive and exploratory research 
study, I determined whether there was a perceived deterrent effect related to the use of 
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph 
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a 
polygraph examination within the same time period. 
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The implications for positive social change are directed at the nation’s national 
security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain 
security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in 
order to fortify the national intelligence infrastructure. In Chapter 1, I include the 
background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, and research 
questions and hypotheses. In addition, I include the theoretical framework, nature of the 
study, operational definition of terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, 
significance of the study, and a summary. 
Background of the Study 
A polygraph is a device that concurrently records a series of different 
physiological channels (American Polygraph Association, 2013; National Center for 
Credibility Assessment [NCCA], 2013b). It originated in the late 19th century from 
research into medical instruments that recorded changes in physiology under a variety of 
circumstances (Landis & Gullette, 1925; National Research Council, 2003; Trovillo, 
1939). When used as a screening device, questions are asked at regular timed intervals 
and the physiological changes are recorded. Polygraph examiners seek trends based on 
guidelines in physiological responses to certain types of questions, which often indicate 
psychological concerns regarding a certain type of question (American Polygraph 
Association, 2013; NCCA, 2011). The polygraph is used in a variety of settings to detect 
psychophysiological elements of deception.  
A screening polygraph examination is conducted as part of an employment 
application process or prior to gaining access to certain special programs, such as 
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operational intelligence platforms and secret military operations programs (U.S. Army, 
1993, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013). Federal agencies that use the polygraph to deter 
and detect unauthorized disclosures include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Energy (DOE), FBI, National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and 
National Security Agency (NSA; ODNI, 2012). The questions asked on a typical 
screening polygraph examination are generally standardized throughout the community 
that uses it (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015). Presumably, the examination is conducted 
without suspicion of wrong-doing on the part of the examinee. The U.S. Government 
conducts approximately 40,000 polygraph examinations every year and the majority of 
the examinations are screening examinations for employment or program access 
(Koerner, 2002, para. 5; National Research Council, 2003). However, the National 
Research Council (2003) noted that little is known about whether polygraph screenings 
are effective in terms of deterring national security crimes.   
Deterrence through polygraph screening examinations typically comes in the form 
of employment avoidance, behavior and attitude change, or behavior maintenance 
(National Research Council, 2003). According to the National Research Council (2003), 
individuals will avoid employment at locations where polygraph exams are employed or 
they will deliberately change prohibited behavior or attitudes in order to comply with the 
regulations (National Research Council, 2003). While there is an abundance of literature 
on the reliability and validity of polygraph analysis, there is a lack of research that 
examines employees’ perceptions about the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis. 
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Therefore, this research study was necessary because it filled that gap and added to the 
literature regarding this topic.  
Statement of the Problem 
 The reliability of polygraph analysis for detecting deception continues to be a 
controversial topic (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some supporters have argued that 
polygraph analysis can detect deception with approximately 80% to 98% accuracy, while 
many scientists reported that the technique detects deception at rates that are only slightly 
better than chance (American Polygraph Association, 2005, p. 9; Cumming, 2009, p. 8; 
Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 1). Until the passage of the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act (EPPA) of 1988, many American businesses used polygraph as a tool for 
screening employees and job applicants (American Polygraph Association, 2005; 
Cumming, 2009; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). However, government agencies, 
contractors working with government agencies, and private-sector employees who are 
suspected of theft are not exempt from polygraph testing (American Polygraph 
Association, 2005; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015).  
Therefore, one way that U.S. federal agencies (e.g., CIA, DIA, DOE, FBI, NGA, 
NRO, and NSA) screen for insider threats is through the use of polygraph examinations 
(Jenkins, 2013; ODNI, 2012). According to the ODNI (2012), Director Clapper 
announced two steps to better protect sensitive information and further deter and detect 
potential leakers within the Intelligence Community. This included adding a mandated 
question related to unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the 
counterintelligence polygraph and requesting independent investigations of selected 
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unauthorized disclosure cases. However, critics of polygraph analysis asserted that the 
technique is based on faulty assumption of a “Pinocchio response,” which is a specific 
physiological lie response or “signature” of deception, as no evidence of such a response 
has been found (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 3). Due to the continuing controversy over 
the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers, a descriptive and 
exploratory research study that determines whether there was a perceived deterrence 
effect related to the use of polygraphs was needed. The findings of this study can be used 
to assess whether other detection techniques and mitigation strategies should be used 
instead.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine 
whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between 
a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past 
year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience 
was more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. Deterrence is defined as 
keeping employees, who have committed or may engage in wrongdoing, out of sensitive 
positions and keeping employees who are already in sensitive positions from doing 
undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003). The National Research Council 
(2003) noted that deterrence is different from the validity of polygraph testing because 
the polygraph can be an effective deterrent even if it does not provide valid information 
about deception. Employees’ perceptions of the deterrent effects of polygraph testing 
were measured through the use of a 15-minute researcher-created survey.  
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In order to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to 
the use of polygraphs, this descriptive and exploratory research study addressed the 
following research questions: 
1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to 
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by 
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to 
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment 
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by 
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
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3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment)? 
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment). 
Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment). 
Theoretical Framework 
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime, 
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986) 
social learning theory (SLT) served as the theoretical foundation for this study. A brief 
overview of the theories is provided in this section with a more detailed explanation 
provided in Chapter 2. This section is organized in the following subsections: Paternoster 
and Simpson’s rational choice model, Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model, and 
SLT. 
Paternoster and Simpson’s Rational Choice Model 
The Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime is essentially a 
subjective expected utility theory (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996) reported that the model is based on two assumptions: “(1) Decisions to 
offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of offending and (2) what 
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are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected expectations of reward and 
cost” (p. 553). The researchers related that the first assumption pertains to individuals 
being at least minimally rational agents and their conduct being partly guided by the 
expected consequences of their behavior. In regard to the second assumption, they noted 
that an implication is made that the critical agent of corporate crime is the individual. The 
researchers suggested that the decision to break the law is made by individuals; however, 
these individuals are affected by the context in which they are employed and commit 
their crimes. Hence, employees who commit corporate crimes are affected by the 
characteristics and imperatives of their business organization. Specifically, the decisions 
of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they perceive for themselves, 
(b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and (c) the presence or absence 
of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context of the organization. 
Vance and Siponen’s Rational Choice Model 
In order to better understand the effect of expected benefits on IS security 
violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational 
choice model as the basis for their theoretical model. Vance and Siponen reported that 
rational choice theory (RCT) had not been used in the field of IS. The researchers related 
that RCT explains individuals’ decisions to commit crimes as utilitarian calculations 
based on perceived benefits and both formal and informal sanctions. Therefore, RCT 
extends beyond deterrence theory by including individuals’ perceptions of benefits of 
violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs. They noted that RCT is 
commonly used to explain criminal behavior; however, it is general enough to cover all 
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violations. Vance and Siponen noted that RCT is also applicable to the study of violations 
of organizational IS security policies. The researchers also noted that RCT has been 
found to explain white-collar crimes better than street-level crimes. Due to this and 
because RCT has been found to be effective in the corporate context (e.g., Paternoster & 
Simpsons, 1996), Vance and Siponen related that they expected it to be a good fit for 
explaining intentional IS security policy violations, which also includes a deliberate 
violation of organizational norms.  
 To better explain IS security policy violations in situations where employees are 
aware of the IS security policy, Vance and Siponen’s (2012) theoretical model includes 
disincentives (sanctions) and incentives (perceived benefits) for violating IS security 
policies. In addition, their model includes both informal sanctions, which are unstated 
social penalties; formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties for specific forms of 
misconduct; and moral beliefs. The researchers’ RCT model includes formal sanctions, 
informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits. 
Social Learning Theory 
Bandura (1974, 1977, 1986) developed SLT in the 1960s, which was later 
changed to social cognitive theory (SCT) in 1986 (Boston University School of Public 
Health, 2013). According to the Boston University School of Public Health (2013), SLT 
posits that learning occurs in a social context with a three-way, dynamic, and reciprocal 
interaction of the person, environment, and behavior. In this theory, focus is placed on 
social influence and external and internal social reinforcement (Boston University School 
of Public Health, 2013). In SLT, consideration is placed on the unique way in which 
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individuals acquire and maintain behavior, while considering the social environment in 
which individuals perform the behavior (Boston University School of Public Health, 
2013). The theory takes into account individuals’ past experiences, which influences 
reinforcement, expectations, and expectancies (Boston University School of Public 
Health, 2013). All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a specific 
behavior and the reasons for doing so.  
SLT’s goal is to explain how individuals regulate their behavior through control 
and reinforcement to achieve goal-directed behavior that can be maintained over time 
(Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). Boston University School of Public 
Health (2013, para. 3) discussed six constructs of SLT: (a) reciprocal determinism, (b) 
behavioral capability, (c) observational learning, (d) reinforcements, (e) expectations, and 
(f) self-efficacy. These constructs are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.  
Nature of the Study 
This descriptive and exploratory research study determined whether there was a 
perceived deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants 
who were subjected to polygraph examination within the past year compared to those  
who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. This 
research design was appropriate as the goal of the research study was to determine 
whether there was a statistically significant difference between the polygraph-treatment 




The 152 participants in the polygraph-treatment group had taken the polygraph 
through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in South Korea 
and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group 
were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens who lived and worked in 
South Korea, were students from the Walden University participant pool, and individuals 
from the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn. Data were obtained 
through a 15-minute researcher-developed questionnaire. Data were analyzed using 
SPSS, which included descriptive statistics, such as means and standard deviations. A t 
test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between 
the groups. In addition, a factor analysis was conducted among the 30 polygraph 
questions. The nature of the study is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
Operational Definition of Terms 
 Counterintelligence: Information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by 
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities (NCCA, 2011). 
Deterrence: “Keeping people who have done or may do certain undesired things 
out of sensitive positions and keeping people already in sensitive positions from doing 
undesired things” (National Research Council, 2003, p. 53). 
Insider threats: Refers to current or former employees, service providers, or 
contractors who are the greatest threat to an organization’s security management due to 
their possible noncompliance with security policies (Boss et al., 2009; Holmlund et al., 
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2010; Holmlund et al., 2011; Jenkins, 2013; Li et al., 2010). 
 Intelligence: Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of 
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons 
(Executive Branch, 2008; U.S. Government, 2013). 
Leak: An unauthorized disclosure of controlled or classified government 
information, often to the open press for publication, which is a deliberate security 
compromise (Elsea, 2013). 
 Lie detector: “Includes a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, 
psychological stress evaluator or similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) used 
to render diagnostic opinion as to the honesty of an individual” (U.S. Department of 
Labor [DOL], 2008, para. 3). 
 Malicious insider threats: Pertains to employees, contractors, and other business 
partners who have authorized access to their organization’s network, system, and data and 
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a way that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or IS (CERT, 
2015). 
National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA): U.S. government’s premiere 
educational center for polygraph and other credibility assessment technologies and 
techniques (NCCA, 2013a). Its central mission is to assist federal agencies in the 
protection of U.S. citizens, interests, infrastructure, and security by providing the best 
education and tools for credibility assessment (NCCA, 2013a). 
Nonmalicious insider threats: Pertains to current and former employees, 
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contractors and other business partners who put their company at risk because they did 
not comply with the suggested security policy due to ignorance or nonmalicious 
negligence (Jenkins, 2013; Vroom & von Solms, 2004). 
Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice model: Is based on two assumptions: 
“(1) Decisions to offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of 
offending and (2) what are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected 
expectations of reward and cost” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996, p. 553). 
 Polygraph: “An instrument that records continuously, visually, permanently, and 
simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory and electrodermal patterns as 
minimum instrumentation standards and is used to render a diagnostic opinion as to the 
honesty or dishonesty of an individual” (DOL, 2008, para. 3). An examinee is asked a 
series of questions and the results are often used in making determinations about access 
to classified information or programs, or assist in determining examinee’s involvement in 
a specific issue (American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International, 
2005; U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], 2006; NCCA, 2011).   
 Polygraph examination: A process that encompasses all activities that take place 
between a polygraph examiner and an examinee during a specific series of interactions 
(NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015).These interactions may include the pretest interview, the 
use of the polygraph instrument to collect physiological data from the examinee while 
presenting a series of tests, the test data analysis phase, and the posttest phase, which may 
include the interrogation of the examinee (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015). 
 Polygraph examiner: Someone who has successfully completed formal education 
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and training in conducting polygraph examinations and is certified by their agency to 
conduct such examinations. Army Polygraph Examiners must possess at a minimum 
counterintelligence special agent training, 2 years investigative experience, a bachelor’s 
degree, completion of the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD) School, 
and successful completion of at least 6 months as an intern (ASTM International, 2005; 
NCCA, 2011). 
 Polygraph test: A portion of the polygraph examination, often called the in-test, in 
which a series of questions are administered, with a polygraph instrument collecting 
physiological information from an examinee, and an analysis is conducted in an effort to 
determine the likelihood of guilt or innocence (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 2015).  
Relevant questions: Questions used during a polygraph that are intended to be the 
focus of the polygraph. Examples of relevant questions are: Have you committed 
espionage against the United States and did you stab that person? (NCCA, 2011; Nelson, 
2015) 
 Screening exam: A multiple relevant issue polygraph test that is given to a 
population without any specific accusation (NCCA, 2011; National Research Council, 
2003; Nelson, 2015).   
Social learning theory (SLT): SLT posits that learning occurs in a social context 
with a three-way, dynamic, and reciprocal interaction of the person, environment, and 
behavior (Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). 
U.S. Intelligence Community: Coalition of 17 agencies and organizations within 
the executive branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather the 
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intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities (ODNI, 
2015b). 
Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model: Explains individuals’ decisions to 
commit crimes as utilitarian calculations based on perceived benefits and both formal and 
informal sanctions (Vance & Siponen, 2012). It also includes individuals’ perceptions of 
benefits of violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs (Vance & 
Siponen, 2012). Thus, their model includes formal sanctions, informal sanctions, moral 
beliefs, and perceived benefits (Vance & Siponen, 2012). 
Assumptions 
 Assumptions made for this study were: 
 The 15-minute researcher-created questionnaire was appropriate for assessing the 
perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs among the two 
groups. 
 The survey was worded so that the participants could accurately interpret the 
information being asked and the participants provided their honest perceptions.  
 The individuals who were recruited and received the hard copy consent form and 
the survey link were the ones who completed the survey.  
 The surveys accurately measured what they are intended to measure.  
 Employees were willing to take part in the study because of its significance. 
 The results of the study will lead to positive social change by further enforcing 




Scope and Delimitations 
The study only focused on the perceived deterrence effect related to the use of 
polygraphs. It did not focus on the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph 
examinations. The study applied to employees who are U.S. citizens and resident aliens 
in the United States and South Korea. Employees in the polygraph-treatment group had 
taken the polygraph within the past year through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph 
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. Employees in the 
no polygraph-treatment group were individuals who had not taken a screening polygraph 
examination in the last year and who were not required to take a polygraph as part of 
their job requirements. They were nonintelligence personnel who lived in South Korea, 
students from the Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden 
University online community site, LinkedIn. Excluded were individuals under the age of 
18 and individuals who had pending polygraph examinations with me in order to prevent 
a possible conflict of interest or perceived quid pro quo bias.  
Limitations  
 This study had several limitations. First, this study determined the perceived 
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between two groups; therefore, the study 
remained distinct in its focus and limited in its scope. This study was not designed to 
answer questions related to the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph 
examinations. Although these topics may be important to public policy and the 
administration field, the psychology field, and the intelligence community, they were not 
the focus of this research effort.  
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A second possible limitation of the study includes generalizing the results since a 
cluster sampling of 326 participants, all of whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident 
aliens located in South Korea and the United States, was used and the results of the study 
are limited to similar populations of employees. The 152 participants in the polygraph-
treatment group had taken the polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph 
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 
participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and 
legal resident aliens who lived and worked in South Korea, were students from the 
Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden University online 
community site, LinkedIn. These employees’ unique perceptions may not be 
generalizable to other populations. 
Third, I used a 15-minute researcher-developed survey, which has not been used 
in past studies. However, a pilot study was conducted on the survey prior to using it in 
the main study. In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from 
two agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help 
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA 
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the 
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure 
consistency with community standards. In addition, the survey was found to have very 
high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90). 
Fourth, selection or sampling bias was another limitation of the study. In regard to 
selection bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received 
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their screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment. 
However, participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections 
between the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any 
preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Future 
research could exclude participants who have taken a polygraph from the researcher. In 
addition, changes to the populations could be made in future research, where more 
similar populations are compared. Specifically, two similar groups of participants who 
work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within 
the last year against those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the 
experience was more than a year prior, could be compared and the results compared to 
the findings found in this study. 
A fifth limitation was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias could have resulted in 
a low response rate on the survey and a decrease in the sample size, which could also 
affect the generalizability of the data. Some surveys could not be used as some 
participants did not complete all the questions. However, there was enough participation 
to meet the sample size needed, where 300 participants was the minimum and 326 
individuals participated in the study.  
A sixth limitation was self-report or social desirability bias. Self-report or social 
desirability bias has to be considered as participants may want to be perceived positively 
so they may not respond honestly. In addition, there are problems inherent with self-
report data as participants may not accurately or fully self-evaluate themselves. In order 
to address this bias, the Likert scale format was used, which did not allow participants the 
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freedom to include additional information that they may have felt was important. In 
addition, it was assumed that participants answered honestly to the questions asked on the 
survey. 
Significance of the Study 
While there is an abundance of literature on the reliability and validity of 
polygraph analysis, this research study added to the literature and advanced knowledge 
by filling a gap in the public policy and administration literature with respect to 
employees’ perceptions about the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis. Findings from 
this study are beneficial not only to the public policy and administration field, but to a 
wide array of other fields, including the fields of psychology and intelligence. The 
findings from the study are also applicable to many agencies and organizations, to 
include the DOD and the coalition of 17 agencies and organizations that are a part of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community including the ODNI, Army Intelligence, FBI, and CIA.  
 The findings from this study also advanced practice and policy. Based on these 
findings, there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between 
the two groups. Employees in sensitive positions who face random polygraph testing may 
take greater care to avoid even minor security infractions in order to avoid the possibility 
of a future deceptive reading on a polygraph test. One of the goals of polygraph testing is 
deterrence, which means keeping employees, who have committed or may engage in 
wrongdoing, out of sensitive positions and keeping employees who are already in 
sensitive positions from doing undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003). 
The findings of Research Question 2 that random polygraph testing may result in a 
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change of behavior and attitude is significant as it may deter actions that threaten national 
interests based on the perceived likelihood and consequences of detection. Therefore, the 
implications for positive social change stemming from these findings include 
recommendations to the nation’s national security agencies to continue enforcing the 
polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the 
possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national 
intelligence infrastructure.  
Summary 
The focus of this study was on whether there was a perceived deterrent effect 
related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a 
polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced 
a polygraph examination within the same time period. Data were collected through the 
use of a 15-minute researcher-created questionnaire with 326 volunteer participants, all of 
whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident aliens located in South Korea and the United 
States. Data were analyzed using SPSS and data analysis included the use of descriptive 
statistics, a t test, and a factor analysis. Findings from this study may advance practice 
and policy by further encouraging policymakers and the nation’s national security 
agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain security 
personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to 
fortify the national intelligence infrastructure.  
In Chapter 1, I included the introduction, background of the study, statement of 
the problem, purpose of the study, research questions and hypotheses, theoretical 
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framework, nature of the study, operational definition of terms, assumptions, scope and 
delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a summary. In Chapter 2, I 
include the introduction, literature search strategy, theoretical foundation, background of 
polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, polygraph as a deterrent 
against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on employees’ behavior and attitudes, 
adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and a summary and conclusions. In 
Chapter 3, I include the introduction, research design and rationale, methodology, data 
analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I include the introduction, 
pilot study, data collection and study results, and a summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5, 
I include the introduction, interpretation of findings, limitations of the study, 
recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this descriptive and exploratory research study, I determined whether there was 
a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of 
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year 
compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience was 
more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. Controversy over the use of 
polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers continues (National Research 
Council, 2003; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Some polygraph proponents claim that the 
polygraph technique is highly accurate and can detect deception with approximately 95% 
accuracy (American Polygraph Association, 2005, p. 5; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015, p. 1). 
However, some scientists argue that the polygraph technique only detects deception at a 
rate that is slightly better than chance (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). 
As the FBI’s economic caseload increases, so does the percentage of cases that 
are attributed to insider threats, where current or former trusted employees, contractors, 
and other business partners are a growing part of the problem (Figliuzzi, 2012). Figliuzzi 
(2012) highlighted a 2012 indictment, where several former employees who had more 
than 70 combined years of service working for a company were convicted of selling trade 
secrets on the production of titanium dioxide to a competitor in China. Figliuizzi 
emphasized that this case was one of the largest economic espionage cases in the FBI’s 
history. In Chapter 2, I include the literature search strategy, theoretical foundation, 
background of polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, polygraph 
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as a deterrent against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on employees’ behavior 
and attitudes, adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and a summary and 
conclusions.  
Literature Search Strategy 
 The literature search included an in-depth search in Walden University Library 
research databases, including all EBSCOhost databases and ProQuest. Databases 
included ProQuest Criminal Justice, Political Science Complete, Political Science 
Complete, Oxford Criminology Bibliographies, International Security and Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, PsycINFO, and 
PsycARTICLES. Organizational websites were also searched such as Secrecy News 
found on the Federation of American Scientists website. Search terms included 
deception, polygraph, lie detection, detection of deception, polygraph and employees, 
polygraph and deterrence effect, polygraph and behavior and attitude, social learning 
theory, rational choice theory, deterrence theory, deterrence, and crime prevention 
through deterrence.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime, 
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986) 
SLT can be used to understand deterrence effects in the workplace. I discussed the 
theoretical propositions of the theories and how they have been applied previously in 
ways similar to this study. This section is organized in the following subsections: rational 
choice theory and social learning theory. 
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Rational Choice Theory 
In this subsection, I discussed Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice 
model. In addition, I discussed Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model. It is 
organized in the following areas: overview, Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice 
model, Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model, and research application of rational 
choice theory. 
Overview. Numerous theorists have been credited with establishing RCT, such as 
Homans (1961), who created a basic framework of exchange theory by using 
assumptions drawn from behaviorist psychology (Scott, 2000). However, other theorists, 
such as Blau (1964), Coleman (1973), and Cook (1977), have expanded on Homans’s 
framework, and developed more formal, mathematical models of RCT (Scott, 2000). In 
addition, Li et al. (2010) reported that Becker (1968) originally developed RCT with the 
premise that offenders weigh the costs and benefits in deciding whether to offend. The 
researchers noted that Becker’s premise has been adapted to various contexts to explain 
deviant behavior and that Paternoster and Simpson (1996) further refined the theory to 
explain corporate crimes or deviant behaviors in the workplace.  
Paternoster and Simpson’s rational choice model. RCT has been found to be 
useful in understanding corporate crime or deviant behaviors in the workplace because 
both corporate crime and corporate offenders are thought to be particularly amenable to 
sanction threats (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). As a result, Paternoster and Simpson 
(1996) related that they extended the rational choice model to study employees’ deviant 
behaviors in the workplace. The researchers argued that past research has generally 
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focused on the deterrent effect of formal sanction threats, but the relevance of other 
potential costs of offending such as loss of occupational position, social censure, personal 
embarrassment, and shame, have not been explicitly included in a comprehensive test of 
RCT of corporate crime. The researchers argued that a more comprehensive empirical 
test of corporate crime that explicitly considers the complete range of available sanctions 
and rewards of corporate offending, as well as the notion of self-censure and morality 
was needed. Subsequently, Paternoster and Simpson noted that they developed a rational 
choice model of corporate crime based in part on Becker’s (1968) neoclassical economic 
theories of crime.  
 The Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime is essentially a 
subjective expected utility theory (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996) reported that the model is based on two assumptions: “(1) Decisions to 
offend are made on a balancing of both the costs and benefits of offending and (2) what 
are important are the decisionmaker’s perceived or subjected expectations of reward and 
cost” (p. 553). The researchers related that the first assumption pertains to individuals 
being at least minimally rational agents and that their conduct is partly guided by the 
expected consequences of their behavior. In regard to the second assumption, the 
researchers noted that an implication made is that the critical agent of corporate crime is 
the individual. The researchers suggested that the decision to break the law is made by 
individuals; however, these individuals are affected by the context in which they are 
employed and commit their crimes. Hence, employees who commit corporate crimes are 
affected by the characteristics and imperatives of their business organization. 
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Specifically, the decisions of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they 
perceive for themselves, (b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and 
(c) the presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific 
context of the organization. 
 The exact form that costs and benefits of corporate crime may take varies 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued that the 
company’s cost could include regulatory, civil, and criminal sanctions; reduced revenue; 
decreased ability to compete against foreign competitors; or a decrease in the company’s 
prestige. The company’s benefit could include increased revenues and prestige and the 
opportunity to challenge the perceived unnecessary regulation or law. On an individual 
level, the cost of corporate crime also includes the possibility of formal legal sanction 
such as civil or criminal sanctions; reduced prestige of the organization where the 
individual works; loss of self-respect; and social censure from colleagues, family, and 
friends. The benefits on an individual level would include career advancement and an 
increase in personal income. Therefore, what is beneficial and costly to the company is 
also beneficial and costly to employees.  
 Furthermore, in additional to instrumental concerns, employees’ decisions to 
commit corporate crime may be affected by normative factors such as their moral 
evaluation of the act (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). According to Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996), employees may be restrained by moral inhibitions; therefore, some acts 
of corporate crime are not committed because they are believed to be wrong. The 
researchers discussed how normative restraints fit into the neoclassical rational choice 
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model from their perspective. First, the researchers related that norms act as constraints 
on employee decision makers, restricting the range of available choices. Second, the 
researchers view this restraint as noninstrumental; therefore, moral inhibitions are not 
based on the consequences of employees’ behavior. Employees do not behave a certain 
way because of the expected outcomes or because it is expected of others; instead, moral 
rules are internalized. 
 Subsequently, certain acts are not committed because it is believed to be morally 
correct not to commit them (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and Simpson 
(1996) drew two implications from this for the role of moral evaluations in conduct. First, 
the researchers reported that employees’ moral beliefs restrain conduct that is deemed to 
be impressible independent of considerations of cost and benefit. Therefore, Paternoster 
and Simpson noted that moral considerations play a significant independent role in 
maintaining conforming conduct. Second, moral considerations should condition the 
impact of instrumental ones. Specifically, the researchers argued that considerations of 
cost and benefit do not affect those acts already strongly inhibited by notions of morality. 
Paternoster and Simpson reasoned that employees’ moral sentiments expressly set some 
behaviors off limits, making them taboo. The taboos are observed due to moral duty and 
not subject to calculations of utility.  
 Employees’ decisions to commit corporate crime may be affected by the context 
or circumstances of the organization (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996) suggested that employees may be more apt to commit corporate crime if 
they perceive the company is losing its competitive edge, suspect the overall economic 
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health of the organization is declining, or the moral climate of the organization tolerates 
or encourages such misconduct. However, the researchers noted that employees may be 
dissuaded from offending if the organization or a staff member has recently been 
sanctioned for similar conduct or the company has organizational restraints such as an 
ethics hotline.  
 In testing their proposed rational choice model of corporate crime, Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996, pp. 555-556) discussed the subjective rewards and costs of corporate 
criminal conduct as perceived by individual decision makers, which include the 
following: 
1. Formal sanction threats: Directed against the company and employees. 
2. Informal sanction threats: Directed against the company and employees. 
3. Self-imposed punishment: Shame. 
4. The perceived benefits of noncompliance: For the company and employees. 
In addition, each employees’ personal stock of moral beliefs about specific forms 
of corporate crime also needs to be assessed (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Paternoster 
and Simpson (1996) also noted that consideration should be given to the context of the 
organization, its competitive status, its moral climate, and its previous experience with 
corporate or employee sanctions for misconduct. In summary, the researchers argued that 
intention to commit corporate crime is a function of the following factors (Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996, p. 556): 
1. Perceived benefits of the action for oneself. 
2. Perceived formal and informal sanctions directed against oneself. 
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3. Feelings of shame or self-imposed punishment. 
4. Moral inhibitions against committing the act. 
5. Perceived benefits of the action for the organization. 
6. Perceived formal and informal sanctions directed against the organization. 
7. Perceived loss of prestige for the organization. 
8. The organizational context of the company. 
9. Characteristics of the organization. 
 Data in Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996, p. 557) study were collected from 84 
business students who were potentially at risk for committing corporate crime and 12 
executives who were currently at risk for such crime. However, the total sample size was 
noted to be 384 because each person read and responded to four different scenarios where 
they described the commission of corporate crime (96 × 4 = 384; Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996, p. 557). The researchers found considerable support for a rational choice model 
that included an appeal to both rationality and morality. Findings indicated that intentions 
to commit four types of corporate crime were affected by formal and informal sanction 
threats, moral evaluations, and organizational factors (CITE). Based on their findings, 
Paternoster and Simpson suggested a number of alternative but compatible strategies for 
dealing with corporate crime. First, they found that enforcement efforts directed at the 
business organization act as a powerful deterrent for those who make decisions within the 
organization. Second, they found that enforcement efforts that are directly targeted at the 
individual decision maker also serve as an effective deterrent to corporate crime. Hence, 
threats of criminal and civil sanctions directed against the individual inhibited the 
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intention to commit corporate crime as well as the fear of informal sanctions. Third, the 
researchers found evidence to suggest that moral appeals may be an especially powerful 
source of corporate social control. As a result, strengthening the business ethics of 
corporate managers may prove to be a very effective crime-control strategy since moral 
inhibitions were found to be a very strong safeguard against corporate crime.  
 Based on their research findings, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued for a 
multifaceted approach to crime control. The researchers related that one part of this 
approach would be the moral education of those engaged in business. They also argued 
for a legalistic approach to corporate crime control through the enforcement of business 
laws and regulations. The researchers claimed that an appeal to legal sanction is 
necessary because findings indicated that an appeal to morality does not work for 
everyone. Therefore, when morality weakens, legal threats must be used to secure 
compliance. In addition, the threat of legal sanctions may be necessary to maintain the 
legitimacy of an extensive network of informal and normative controls. The researchers 
found that legal sanctions directed at the organization are a significant factor in 
supporting employees’ beliefs that corporate crime is wrong, shame occurs if one were to 
commit it, and in strengthening the credibility of legal sanctions for employees. The 
researchers contended that theoretical models of corporate crime and public policy efforts 
must contain instrumental (threats of punishment) and deontological (appeals to morality) 
factors.   
Vance and Siponen’s rational choice model. In order to better understand the 
effect of expected benefits on IS security violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used 
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Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model as the basis for their theoretical 
model. Vance and Siponen reported that RCT had not been used in the field of IS. The 
researchers related that RCT explains individuals’ decisions to commit crimes as 
utilitarian calculations based on perceived benefits and both formal and informal 
sanctions. Therefore, RCT extends beyond deterrence theory by including individuals’ 
perceptions of benefits of violations and informal sanctions, and espoused moral beliefs. 
They noted that RCT is commonly used to explain criminal behavior; however, it is 
general enough to cover all violations. Vance and Siponen noted that RCT is also 
applicable to the study of violations of organizational IS security policies. The 
researchers also noted that RCT has been found to explain white-collar crimes better than 
street-level crimes. Due to this and because RCT has been found to be effective in the 
corporate context (e.g., Paternoster & Simpsons, 1996), Vance and Siponen related that 
they expected it to be a good fit for explaining intentional IS security policy violations, 
which also includes a deliberate violation of organizational norms.  
 To better explain IS security policy violations in situations where employees are 
aware of the IS security policy, Vance and Siponen’s (2012) theoretical model includes 
disincentives (sanctions) and incentives (perceived benefits) for violating IS security 
policies. In addition, their model includes both informal sanctions, which are unstated 
social penalties; formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties for specific forms of 
misconduct; and moral beliefs. The researchers’ RCT model includes formal sanctions, 
informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits. 
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 In regard to formal sanctions, which are explicit penalties imposed for specific 
forms of misconduct, researchers found that the severity of the formal sanctions had a 
significant effect on users’ intentions to commit computer abuses (e.g., D’Arcy, Hovav, 
& Galletta, 2009; Straub, 1990). Due to this theoretical and empirical support, Vance and 
Siponen (2012) hypothesized that “formal sanctions negatively affect intention to violate 
IS security policy” (p. 25). Examples of informal sanctions (unstated social penalties for 
undesirable behavior), include disapproval from friends or peers, social censure, or 
embarrassment (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; 
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Vance and Siponen reported that depending on the type of 
offense, empirical findings regarding the effects of informal sanctions have been mixed. 
Therefore, the researchers hypothesized that “informal sanctions negatively affect 
intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 25).  
 Moral belief is another element of Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice 
model. Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992) suggested that the traditional views of 
RCT do not take into account the moral beliefs of individuals. Bachman et al. posited that 
individuals may refrain from offending not because they fear sanctions but because they 
evaluate the offense as morally wrong. The researchers discussed two possible reasons 
for this, which are as follows: (a) Individuals’ moral beliefs are so strong that other 
factors are irrelevant and (b) when moral beliefs are not strongly held, formal sanctions 
are then needed. Of these two components, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that 
moral inhibitions are the strongest predictor of corporate crime, which is supported by 
other research findings (e.g., Bachman et al., 1992; Ellis & Simpson, 1995). Vance and 
34 
 
Siponen claimed that moral beliefs are relevant to the context of information security 
because choices generally pertaining to information security and choices specifically 
pertaining to security policies involve a moral component (see Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, 
Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009; Stahl, 2004). Vance and Siponen hypothesized that “moral 
beliefs negatively affect intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 26).  
 Findings from empirical studies have supported the notion that perceived benefits 
positively affect decisions to commit violations (e.g., Ducan, Lafree, & Piquero, 2005; 
Puhakainen, 2006; Wood, Gove, Wilson, & Cochran, 1997). Perceived benefits might be 
intrinsic such as the excitement some individuals may experience when committing a 
crime or extrinsic such as money (Ducan, Lafree, & Piquero, 2005; Puhakainen, 2006; 
Wood, Gove, Wilson, & Cochran, 1997). Puhakainen (2006) found that time saving is a 
major incentive to violate or avoid IS security policies. Vance and Siponen hypothesized 
that “perceived benefits positively affect intention to violate IS security policy” (p. 26).  
 To examine IS security policy violations, Vance and Siponen (2012) used a 
hypothetical scenario method. Data were collected from a high-tech services company 
and a major bank, both of which handled sensitive information. Both organizations were 
chosen because they used IS security policies and had clear sanctions in place for policy 
violations. Findings indicated that moral beliefs are an important predictor of intention to 
violate IS security policies, which is consistent with findings from previous research 
(e.g., Bachman et al., 1992; D’Archy et al., 2009; Elis & Simpson, 1995; Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996; Siponen, 2000, 2002). Vance and Siponen’s interpretation of this finding 
is that if employees view violations of IS security policies as morally wrong, they are less 
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likely to commit them. On the other hand, if employees believe that it is morally 
acceptable to violate the norm, then they are more likely to do so.  
 A second finding in Vance and Siponen’s (2012) study indicated that perceived 
benefits also had a significant positive effect on intention, but the direction was opposite 
that of moral beliefs. Based on this finding, the researchers suggested that if employees 
see a benefit in violating IS security policy, then they are more likely to do so. As a 
result, they noted that mangers should take into account potential benefits that may 
prompt noncompliance, such as saving time. Thus, security managers may use IS security 
training to address the potential benefit of saving time, which may be perceived as a 
reason for policy violations.  
A third finding was that the effect of formal sanctions was not supported (Vance 
& Siponen, 2012). Vance and Siponen (2012) noted that research pertaining to sanctions 
in the IS field are mixed. For example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that only the severity 
of formal sanctions effectively reduced IS misuse. In contrast, Hu, Xu, Dinev, and Ling 
(2010) found that formal sanctions had a small effect on employee intentions to commit 
computer offenses. A fourth finding was that the effect of informal sanctions was not 
supported; however, a small, significant effect (p < .10) was detected (Xu et al., 2010. 
30). In regard to the interpretation of the formal sanctions and informal sanctions 
findings, the researchers argued that formal sanctions such as penalties and informal 
sanctions such as the loss of respect from management and coworkers, do not work as 
deterrents in the context of employees’ compliance with IS security procedures. In regard 
to informal sanctions, the researchers related that employees do not care about penalties 
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and the loss of respect because they perceive penalties and lack of respect to be minor 
issues. Vance and Siponen also noted another possible interpretation related to 
Kohlberg’s (1976, 1984) cognitive theory of moral development, which suggests that 
only individuals who are in the initial stages of moral development are influenced by 
sanctions.  
In summary, moral beliefs, perceived benefits, and informal sanctions showed 
significant effects in explaining employee IS security policy violations (Vance & 
Siponen, 2012). In contrast, the effect of formal sanctions was insignificant (Vance & 
Siponen, 2012). Based on their findings, Vance and Siponen (2012) suggested that 
organizations should include other means to discourage IS security violations apart from 
formal sanctions because they are not always effective in deterring policy violations. 
Hence, in addition to formal sanctions, the researchers recommended that security 
managers engage in positive means of reinforcement, such as arranging IS security 
training sessions in order to persuade employees that the violation of IS security policies 
is morally wrong and compliance with policies is morally right. In regard to perceived 
benefits of violating IS security policies, the researchers suggested that top management 
and supervisors communicate clear and consistent message that saving work time does 
not justify the violation of IS security policies. Thus, adhering to IS security policies is 
important to employee job descriptions and responsibilities.  
Research application of rational choice theory. Along with the benefits 
associated with the use of Internet technology in the workplace, threats such as increased 
security risks and improper use are major concerns for most companies (Li et al., 2010). 
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Li et al. (2010) reported that nonwork-related Internet activities, such as checking 
personal e-mails, browsing nonwork-related websites, chatting online, gaming, investing, 
shopping, and cybercrimes, reduces employees’ productivity and can cause various 
security breaches such as viruses and spyware. Despite companies adopting and 
implementing Internet use policies (IUPs) to reduce employees’ Internet misuse, the 
scope of Internet misuse is still on the rise due to noncompliance (Foster, 2006). Young 
and Case (2004) found that of the 25 companies that implemented IUPs, 40% found the 
policies to be an effective deterrent to curb employee Internet abuse, 40% did not find the 
policies effective, and 20% did not respond (p. 108). Of the 10 companies that used 
management training, 40% found it to be an effective deterrent, while 50% found it 
ineffective, and 10% did not respond (Young & Case, 2004, p. 108). Rehabilitation 
training was found to be effective by one company that used it as a way to deal with 
employee Internet abuse.  
Prior to 2010, there was a lack of studies that provided full insight into why 
noncompliance with security policies occur because researchers ignored the effect of 
perceived benefits of deviant behaviors, moral values, and the conditions for formal 
sanctions to be effective (Li et al., 2010). As a result, Li et al. (2010) reported that they 
applied Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime to 
examine how employees’ intention to comply with IUP is driven by cost-benefit 
assessments, personal norms, and organizational context factors. Li et al. examined their 
research model, where they suggested that employees’ IUP compliance intention will 
increase when (a) “employees perceive high threats from formal or informal sanctions or 
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high security risks to their computer or data and (b) employees have high personal norms 
against Internet abuses” (p. 637). In addition, based on their model, personal norms 
against Internet abuses can be increased by the joint effect of organizational norms and 
organizational identification.  
Participants in Li et al. (2010) study were organizational employees and 246 
usable responses were received from the online survey (p. 639). Li et al. (2010) reported 
that their findings were consistent with Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice 
model of corporate crime. Findings indicated that employees’ intention to comply with 
the IUP involves a cost-benefit analysis. The researchers found that employees were 
more likely to comply with the IUP when perceived benefits were overridden by potential 
risks from formal sanctions and security threats. The deterrence effect of formal sanction 
risks was largely exerted through detection probability instead of sanction severity. Thus, 
sanction severity was not an effective deterrence mechanism for the majority of 
employees. In addition, the social influence from others who are important or subjective 
norms was not a significant predictor for the intention to comply with the IUP.  
Furthermore, findings indicated that along with the cost-benefit analysis, 
compliance intention is also influenced by employees’ personal norms or moral standards 
against Internet abuses (Li et al., 2010). Li et al. (2010) related that personal norms 
moderate the effect of perceived sanction severity on the compliance intention. Perceived 
sanction severity was found to be a significant deterrence mechanism only for employees 
with very low personal norms against Internet abuses. For employees with moderate to 
high personal norms, the perception of harsh sanctions failed to increase their compliance 
39 
 
intention and also reduced it. Harsh sanctions may undermine the trust or loyalty toward 
a company and create a counterproductive effect on the compliance intention among 
those with moderate to high personal norms against Internet abuses. In addition, the 
researchers found that organizational context factors could indirectly influence individual 
employees’ compliance intention. Overall, results indicated that employees’ compliance 
intention was the result of competing influences of perceived benefits, formal sanctions, 
and security risks. Moreover, the effect of sanction severity was found to be moderated 
by personal norms. 
Findings from Li et al. (2010) study also indicated that employees conduct 
Internet abuses due to the perceived benefits, such as a more interesting work life. Li et 
al. (2010) noted that it may not be possible to use a zero Internet usage policy for 
personal purposes in the workplace as it could decrease employees’ trust and morale and 
increase enforcement cost. Instead, the researchers recommended the use of a fair IUP 
with a clause that says “reasonable use” (p. 644). The researchers also recommended that 
companies use several approaches to ensure employees’ IUP compliance. Thus, 
companies could increase personal moral norms against Internet abuses by cultivating 
voluntary compliance with security policies. Companies could further promote voluntary 
policy compliance though periodic security training, educating employees about risks 
from Internet security breaches. Companies could also implement various control 
mechanisms to monitor the usage of the Internet and inform employees that they could be 
caught if they abuse their Internet access. Hence, the sanction-based mechanism could be 
used to complement the voluntary compliance approach. Furthermore, the researchers 
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noted that companies could work to increase employees’ organizational identification or 
their sense of belonging to the company so that employees are more likely to act in the 
company’s interest and follow the IUP.  
Social Learning Theory 
 In this subsection, I discussed the theoretical propositions of Bandura’s (1974, 
1977, 1986) SLT. In addition, I discussed how the theory has been applied previously in 
ways similar to this study. This subsection is organized in the following areas: theory and 
research application of social learning theory. 
 Theory. Bandura (1974, 1977, 1986) developed SLT in the 1960s, which was 
later changed to SCT in 1986 (Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). 
According to Boston University School of Public Health (2013), SLT posits that learning 
occurs in a social context with a three-way, dynamic and reciprocal interaction of the 
person, environment, and behavior. In this theory, focus is placed on social influence and 
external and internal social reinforcement. In SLT, consideration is placed on the unique 
way in which individuals acquire and maintain behavior, while considering the social 
environment in which individuals perform the behavior. The theory takes into account 
individuals’ past experiences, which influences reinforcement, expectations, and 
expectancies. All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a specific 
behavior and the reasons for doing so.  
SLT’s goal is to explain how individuals regulate their behavior through control 
and reinforcement to achieve goal-directed behavior that can be maintained over time 
(Boston University School of Public Health, 2013). Boston University School of Public 
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Health (2013, para. 3) discussed six constructs, where Bandura developed the first five as 
part of SLT and the sixth construct known as self-efficacy was added when the theory 
evolved into SCT:  
1. Reciprocal determinism: This is the theory’s central construct and pertains to 
the dynamic and reciprocal interaction of person (an individual with a set of 
learned experiences), environment (external social context), and behavior 
(responses to stimuli to achieve goals). 
2. Behavioral capability: This construct pertains to individuals’ ability to 
perform a behavior through essential knowledge and skills. They learn from 
the consequences of their behavior, which affects their environment. 
3. Observational learning: In regard to this construct, individuals can witness and 
observe a behavior that is conducted by others and then reproduce those 
actions; thus, modeling the behavior.  
4. Reinforcements: This construct has the greatest ties to the reciprocal 
relationship between behavior and environment. It pertains to the internal or 
external responses of people’s behaviors that affect whether they will continue 
or discontinue the behavior. Individuals may self-initiate the reinforcement or 
it may be from the environment, which may also be positive or negative.  
5. Expectations: This pertains to the anticipated consequences of individuals’ 
behaviors. Individuals anticipate the consequences of their actions before they 
engage in the behavior and these anticipated consequence influence the 
successful completion of the behavior.  
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6. Self-efficacy: This construct is influenced by individuals’ confidence in their 
ability to successful perform a behavior. Self-efficacy is influenced by 
people’s specific capabilities, other individual factors, and environmental 
factors such as barriers and facilitators.  
Therefore, in contrast to other learning theories, SLT emphasizes reciprocal 
relationship between social characteristics of the environment, how individuals perceive 
them, and how motivated and able individuals are to reproduce behaviors they see 
occurring around them (Health Communication Capacity Collaboration, 2015). In 
summary, Health Communication Capacity Collaboration (2015) related that in regard to 
SLT, people learn by observing what others do, consider the consequences that others 
experienced, rehearse (mentally first) what might happen in their own lives if they 
followed other’s behavior, take action by trying the behavior, compare their experiences 
with what happened to others, and confirm their belief in the new behavior.  
Research application of social learning theory. The relationship between 
deterrence and SLT has been discussed on numerous occasions by Akers (1977, 1985, 
1990). According to Akers (1990), empirical tests of SLT have included measures of both 
formal deterrence (perceived probability of being caught by police officers) and informal 
parental deterrence (perceived probability of being caught by parents). Akers noted that 
the term deterrence is used because the measures referred only to perception of the 
likelihood of punishment. The author noted that neither formal deterrence nor informal 
parental deterrence have much direct effect because each pertain to variation in perceived 
likelihood of aversive consequences. Therefore, other variables that measure both reward 
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and aversive consequences and the balance of positive and negative reactions from peers 
and parents have strong effects. The behavioral formula in SLT includes both positive 
and negative punishment and reinforcement. In addition, it includes schedules of 
reinforcement, imitation, associations, normative definitions such as attitudes and 
rationalization, discriminative stimuli, and other variables in criminal and conforming 
behavior.  
 Using SLT as their theoretical foundation, Yiu, Xu, and Wan (2014) extended 
corporate financial fraud research by developing a new perspective on the deterrence 
effects of vicarious punishments. The researchers posited that employees vicariously 
learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental 
cues, and social cues in the inhibitive learning process; thus, becoming deterred from 
committing future fraudulent acts. The researchers used a matched sample of 604 listed 
companies between 2002 and 2008. Findings showed that an observing employee was 
deterred from committing fraud if peers in the industry were caught and punished. 
Furthermore, such deterrence effects are dependent on how observing employees 
evaluate the possibility of being caught and the likelihood that they will be similarly 
punished if they violate similar prohibitions. In particular, the researchers found that 
inhibitive learning effects were positively moderated by punishments of prominent 
employees and model-observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development 
of the legal system. The researchers’ study illuminated the indirect, inhibitive learning 
process from vicarious punishments and identified the conditions for differential learning 
and deterrence outcomes of the observing employees.  
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Background of Polygraph Testing 
Advancements in medical understanding of human physiology and advances in 
the field of psychology led to combining a number of measurable physiological reactions 
on a single sheet of paper, which became known as the polygraph (Kleinmuntz & 
Szucko, 2004). The term polygraph originally meant many writings but now represents a 
specific field that operates at the confluence of psychology and human physiology 
(American Polygraph Association, 2013; National Research Council, 2003; Nelson, 
2015). According to the NCCA (2013b), the term most commonly applied to polygraph is 
psychophysiological detection of deception. The term polygraph originated with the 
multiple physiological reactions recorded on a single medium. Originally the medium 
was paper, but with the introduction of computers, a file with graphically represented 
physiology similar to what would be recorded on paper, along with other pertinent file 
details, is now standard (Handler & Nelson, 2015; NCCA, 2013b). 
Marston and Reid were significant figures in the evolution of the polygraph test 
and expanded the use of polygraph testing within the federal government (Bunn, 1997; 
National Research Council, 2003). Marston developed interview and physiology 
collection techniques (Bunn, 1997; National Research Council, 2003). Specifically, 
Marston invented the discontinuous polygraph, which records physiological signals only 
at select times during an interrogation (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and 
Lilienfeld (2015) reported that Moulton claimed that the polygraph was the solution to 
detecting deception during interrogation. The researchers noted that in 1921, Larson built 
on Marston’s invention and created the continuous polygraph called cardio-pneumo-
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psychograph. However, in contrast to Marston, Larson was critical of the polygraph and 
cautioned against its use in court proceedings. In line with Larson’s viewpoint, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided in Frye v. United States (1923) that there was insufficient 
scientific support to allow polygraph results to be used as evidence in court proceedings.  
In response to the Frye ruling, scientists worked towards developing scientifically 
validated polygraph techniques (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). In 1930, Larson’s associate, 
Keeler, and Reid who was a major proponent of law enforcement’s use of polygraph 
testing, assisted in forming the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern 
University (Bunn, 1997; National Research Council, 2003; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). 
In 1938, Keeler opened the first polygraph training school and in 1947, Reid opened John 
E. Reid and Associates (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). These two schools became the most 
prominent U.S. polygraphy schools (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). 
Although most polygraphs measure similar physiological indicators, polygraphers 
use different interrogation techniques (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and Lilienfeld 
(2015) related that the three most commonly used methods of interrogation are the 
irrelevant/relevant (I/R) test, the control question test (CQT), and the guilty knowledge 
test (GKT). The researchers noted that the I/R test was the original method of 
interrogation and this method is still commonly used by employers during personnel 
screening interviews. Sylvers and Lilienfeld reported that the I/R test uses a combination 
of task-irrelevant and task-relevant questions. The CQT is a variant of the I/R test and is 
currently the method that is most commonly used in the United States (Sylvers & 
Lilienfeld, 2015). Sylvers and Lilienfeld noted that this method uses a combination of 
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control, task-relevant, and task-irrelevant questions. The GKT technique is used to 
investigate criminal guilt without attempting to identify a lie response; therefore, it is a 
sharp contrast from the I/R test and CQT. Polygraphers use the GKT to assess concealing 
knowledge by asking specific questions about the crime followed by multiple choice 
options. The researchers noted that U.S. law enforcement agencies rarely use the GKT.  
The polygraph examination generally relies on a structured interview, a thorough 
review of questions to be asked, a collection of physiological responses to those questions 
in a structured format, and if necessary, a postexamination interview (American 
Polygraph Association, 2013; Nelson, 2015). There has been minimal change to the 
actual physiological collection aspect of polygraphy since the U.S. Government began 
using the polygraph as an investigative tool in the 1950s (American Polygraph 
Association, 2013; Nelson, 2015). The four general physiological channels that are 
recorded are breathing, cardio activity, electrodermal conductance, and movement 
(American Polygraph Association, 2013; Handler & Nelson, 2015; Nelson, 2015). A 
structured series of questions are asked, which are recorded on a computer, and the 
examiner evaluates the physiological reactions to the various questions (American 
Polygraph Association, 2013; Handler & Nelson, 2015; Nelson, 2015)..   
 The methods used in polygraphy have been extensively researched similar to 
other commonly accepted forensic investigative techniques, such as hand writing 
analysis, witness line-ups, and crime scene evidence collection (Cochrane, Tett, & 
Vandecreek, 2003; National Research Council, 2003). Currently, polygraph examinations 
are mainly used in law enforcement and the U.S. Intelligence Community (Executive 
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Branch, 2008; NCCA, 2011; National Research Council, 2003; ODNI, 2015a). The major 
uses for the polygraph exam in the U.S. are for pre-employment screening, sensitive 
program access screening for current employees, and specific issue exams for resolving 
issues such as crimes (DOD, 1984; Handler & Nelson, 2015; ODNI, 2015a). Reliability 
rates vary depending on whether or not the exam is a multiple issue exam or a specific 
issue exam (DOD, 1984; Handler & Nelson, 2015; ODNI, 2015a). Resolution rates, when 
inconclusive calls are excluded, are well over chance, often approaching 85% to 95% or 
higher when a conclusive result is reached (Gougler et al., 2011; Nelson, 2015).   
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 
 Until the late 1980s, many American businesses used polygraph testing as a tool 
to screen job applicants and employees (Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015). However, with the 
passage of the EPPA of 1988, which is enforced by the DOL, employers engaged in 
interstate commerce are not permitted to use lie detector tests for preemployment 
screening or during the course of employment, with certain exemptions (American 
Polygraph Association, 2005; Sylvers & Lilienfeld, 2015; DOL, 2008). According to the 
DOL (2008), exempt from the Act are federal, state, and local governments (DOL, 2008). 
The federal government is permitted to give lie detector tests to employees of federal 
contractors engaged in national security intelligence or counterintelligence functions. The 
polygraph, but no other lie detector tests, may be administered in the private sector for 
the following reasons (DOL, 2008, para. 6): 
48 
 
1. To employees who are reasonably suspected of being involved in a workplace 
incident that results in economic loss to the employer and who had access to 
the property that is the subject of the investigation. 
2. To prospective employees of armored car, security alarm, and security guard 
firms who protect facilities, materials, or operations affecting health or safety, 
national security, or currency and similar instruments. 
3. To prospective employees of pharmaceutical and other firms authorized to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances who will have 
direct access to such controlled substances. In addition, to current employees 
who had access to persons or property that are the subject of an ongoing 
investigation.  
Examiners are required to have a valid or current license if it is a prerequisite by 
the state in which the polygraph test is to be conducted (DOL, 2008). The DOL (2008, 
para. 7) also noted that examiners are required to maintain a minimum of $50,000 bond 
or professional liability coverage. Under the Act, prospective and current employees also 
have legal rights. For example, prospective and current employees must be given a 
written notice that explains their rights and the limitations imposed, such as questions that 
are prohibited and restrictions on how the test results can be used. Within 3 years of an 
alleged violation, prospective and current employees also have the right to take civil 
actions in a federal or state court against employers who violate the Act for legal or 




Polygraph as a Deterrent Against Security Compromises 
In an effort to address issues of crimes and screening for intelligence purposes, 
the U.S. Army instituted its own polygraph training academy in the early 1950s (NCCA, 
2013b). Use of the polygraph expanded from the U.S. Army to the federal government 
and law enforcement agencies to use within the commercial sector (NCCA, 2013b). 
Some employees who worked as clerks and bank tellers also had to do polygraph testing 
(Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 2004). The expansive use of polygraph testing was driven by 
organizations’ attempt to reduce theft of merchandise and money (National Research 
Council, 2003).   
However, there were exceptions to the law, which allowed federal government 
and law enforcement agencies to require a polygraph as a condition of employment 
(DOD, 1984; DOL, 2013; U.S. Government, 2013). The U.S. Army, a uniformed service 
within the DOD, is authorized to use a screening polygraph to enhance protection of its 
programs and seek out violations of certain national security laws (DOD, 1984; U.S. 
Army, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013). The Intelligence and Security Command of the 
U.S. Army, a member of the Intelligence Community, is authorized to use screening 
polygraph examinations as part of its employee vetting process (DOD, 1984; U.S. Army, 
1995; U.S. Government, 2013). One of the purposes of requiring individuals to undergo 
these screening exams is to protect programs that are attractive targets for foreign 
governments, terrorist groups, and insider threats (DOE, 2013). One of the stated goals of 
the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command’s polygraph program is to deter 
intentional violations of applicable security regulations (U.S. Army, 1993). However, 
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despite deterrence efforts taken by many federal-level organizations, such as the U.S. 
Army’s use of polygraph testing, some organizations fall victim to deliberate security 
compromises (Defense Personnel and Security Research Center [PERSEREC], 2009; 
Executive Branch, 2008).   
The ODNI is an organization created in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks (9/11) to integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense 
of the United States (ODNI, 2013). There are 17 members of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community and the ODNI is charged with providing direction and deconfliction to each 
member on a national level (ODNI, 2013, 2015b). The U.S. Army’s Intelligence and 
Security Command falls under the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and is a 
member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (ODNI, 2015b).   
Despite the use of polygraph analysis, a number of other high profile information 
leaks have occurred of sensitive operations such as the foiling of a covert al-Qa’ida plot 
to blow up an airliner with a sophisticated undergarment bomb, a collaboration of U.S. 
and Israeli cyber operations designed to disrupt Iranian nuclear ambitions, and supposed 
release of unauthorized information to journalists about the covert raid to kill Osama bin 
Laden (Mak, 2012). This problem has become increasingly more political. To help 
protect high level national security information, Clapper, the Director of National 
Intelligence, announced steps to detect and deter unauthorized disclosures (ODNI, 2012). 
The ODNI (2012) reported that these steps included the addition of a mandated question 
in relation to unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the counterintelligence 
polygraph. The director announced the independent investigations of selected 
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unauthorized cases by the intelligence community inspector general (ICIG) when 
Department of Justice (DOJ) declines to prosecute. The goal is to prevent selected 
unauthorized disclosures cases that meet the threshold for administrative investigation 
from being prematurely closed.  
Polygraph’s Effect on Employees’ Behaviors and Attitudes 
Polygraph examinations are used for preemployment or preclearance screening in 
agencies involved in national security (National Research Council, 2003). The National 
Research Council (2003) noted that current employees who are being considered for new 
assignments, normally at a higher level of clearance, take part in preclearance screening. 
Insider threats are becoming more frequent due to a number of reason, such as the 
following (Figliuzzi, 2012, para. 4):  
1. The pervasiveness of employee financial hardships during economic 
difficulties. 
2. The global crisis facing foreign nations, which makes it even more attractive. 
3. Cost-effective and worth the risk to steal technology rather than invest in 
research and development. 
4. The ease of stealing anything stored electronically, especially when the 
individual has legitimate access to it. 
5. The increasing exposure to foreign intelligence services presented by the 
reality of global business, joint ventures, and the growing international 
footprint of U.S. companies.  
 The U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command uses the polygraph in the 
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execution of its intelligence mission (U.S. Army, 1993, 1995; U.S. Government, 2013). 
Among the mission of the polygraph program is deterrence of national security crimes 
such as deliberate mishandling of classified information, espionage, and terrorism (DOE, 
2013; U.S. Army, 1993). In order for a deterrence to be effective, researchers mentioned 
that the population that is expected to change should be aware that there are certain 
consequences (e.g., Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Paternoster et 
al., 1983a; Watson, 1986). Similarly, Wright (2010) noted that employees who leak 
information should be aware that there is an increased likelihood of detection and 
subsequent punishment. The National Research Council (2003) noted that individuals 
who are subjected to polygraph testing will either resign to avoid the exam and 
subsequent interrogation, decide not to engage in a prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a 
particular agency altogether. For those subjected to polygraph testing on a regular basis in 
order to gain continued access to sensitive programs, the desired effect is that of 
continued adherence to rules, or self-directed behavior and attitude change, or 
modification (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; ODNI, 2015a; U.S. 
Army, 1993).   
An example of this can be seen with the U.S. Navy drug testing program. Drug 
testing has affected the U.S. Navy in a dramatic way. After the U.S. Navy instituted 
mandatory and random drug testing for its personnel in 1981, the U.S. Navy saw an 
immediate drop of 60% in drug use (Borack, 1998). Researchers found that the drop was 
attributed to the deterrence effect of personnel avoiding or changing their behavior 
(Borack, 1998; Peterson, Jung, & Stanley, 2008; Strelan & Boeckman, 2006).  
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Adhering to Security Regulations Due to Polygraph 
The use of polygraph has been mandated for employees in certain jobs who have 
access to highly sensitive information and activities in an effort to deter leaks (U.S. Army, 
1993). The use of polygraph testing as a deterrence in the national security setting focuses 
on reducing incidents of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, unauthorized foreign contact, 
and deliberate mishandling of classified information by expectations of changes in 
behavior and attitude (DOE, 2013; U.S. Army, 1993). During a screening examination, 
one of the national security issues that is tested for is the mishandling of classified 
information (National Research Council, 2003; ODNI, 2012). Pozen (2013) noted that 
security compromises of classified information are very difficult to prosecute. Even 
though there have been over 100 successful prosecutions for espionage, there are 
probably hundreds of security compromises of classified information every year to the 
media (PERSEREC, 2009; Pozen, 2013). Pozen argued that historically, there has been a 
level of complacency within the Executive Branch in prosecuting security compromises.  
Security compromises are a type of informal currency through which one can gain 
an advantage (Pozen, 2013). Pozen related that it is also a very secretive world in which 
journalists protect confidential informants to the point of voluntarily going to jail to 
protect their identity (Pozen, 2013; Schmitt, 2005). An example of a major security 
compromise involves Private First Class Bradley Manning who leaked the U.S State 
Department’s cables and Iraq war logs (U.S. Army, 2011; United States v. Manning, 
2013). Manning leaked hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. State Department cables 
to Wikileaks, an organization dedicated to whistle blowers anonymity, who subsequently 
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published most of the documents on the Internet (U.S. Army, 2011; United States v. 
Manning, 2013). In contrast to high ranking members of the executive branch who are 
most often associated with leaks, Manning was a low-level U.S. Army intelligence 
analyst (Elsea, 2013; Pozen, 2013; U.S. Army, 2011; United States v. Manning, 2013). 
Similarly, there are a number of incidents in which former CIA employees accidentally or 
intentionally released information about classified operations or undercover agents 
(Associated Press, 2013; Liptak, 2005; Mak, 2012).   
Convicted Russian espionage agent and former U.S. Naval Warrant Officer John 
Walker was instructed by his Russian case officers to avoid attaining a job that required a 
polygraph in order to continue his access to classified information without increased fear 
of detection (PERSEREC, 2009). The PERSEREEC (2009) reported that Walker was 
instructed to retire instead of being promoted into a job that required a polygraph. 
Similarly, convicted spy and former FBI agent Robert Hanssen also avoided jobs where 
polygraph exams were required as a condition of employment. The PERSEREEC further 
related that the CIA uses polygraph exams to maintain security, to include 
counterintelligence investigations that rooted out and provided evidence to prosecute 
Russian Spy Harold Nicholson. Other successful national security crime prosecutions that 
were predicated on polygraph admissions include those by former U.S. Navy Seaman 
Steven Hawkins, who admitted to storing classified documents with plans to sell them to 
a foreign government in 1981; Steven Lalas, imprisoned for espionage on behalf of 
Greece and admitted much more than initial debriefings indicated only after failing a 
number of polygraph exams in 1993; and Ronald Montaperto, convicted of espionage for 
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China and made full disclosure of espionage only after being confronted during a 
polygraph session in 2003 (PERSEREC,, 2009). 
After a series of high profile security compromises, President Obama ordered 
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, to coordinate and conduct more 
comprehensive polygraph exams in an attempt to root out unauthorized disclosures, 
calling it a war on leakers (Mak, 2012; ODNI, 2012; Pozen, 2013). Pozen (2013) related 
that while the federal government has the right to pursue prosecution against those who 
are suspected of leaking information, the courts generally protect the press. The Obama 
Administration is responsible for half of the prosecutions pertaining to leaked 
information to the press since the Espionage Act of 1917 (DOJ Office of Public Affairs, 
2012; Mak, 2012; Schmidt, 2013; Schmitt, 2005). Pozen highlighted that there are few 
successful prosecutions despite the huge number of leaks. However, the Obama 
Administration attained a guilty plea in the prosecution of a former CIA employee who 
provided details about covert operations and sources to a member of the media. The 
former employee plead guilty to disclosing the identity of an undercover agent. This 
successful prosecution of the former CIA employee has emboldened the Obama 
Administration as they have added additional charges against other individuals awaiting 
prosecution for security violations (Aftergood, 2012; United States of America v. 
Hitselberger, 2012). 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Since recorded history, mankind has sought ways of determining if another person 
is being deceptive (National Research Council, 2003). With scientific developments and 
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improvements in law enforcement, a method known as polygraph analysis was developed 
to record changes in physiology which resulted in a high resolution rate in detecting 
certain types of deception (National Research Council, 2003). This technique was 
eventually refined and adapted by the DOD, who now uses it in an effort to deter and 
detect certain types of national security crimes (DOD, 1984; DOE, 2013; Handler & 
Nelson, 2015; NCCA, 2011). 
 Deterrence results in either behavior and attitude change that are more consistent 
with the organization or a person avoids employment at an agency that requires a 
screening polygraph (National Research Council, 2003). Wright (2010) noted that in 
order for deterrence to be effective, the population where the deterrence effect is sought 
must be aware of both severity and certainty of a punishment. Even though severity has 
an effect on deterrence, the certainty of detection and punishment has a much greater 
effect (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster et al., 1983b; 
Wright, 2010). For example, the change in behavior and attitude when there is certainty 
of punishment can be seen in the changes in drug use within organizations that mandate 
both initial and random drug testing for its employees (Borack, 1998). In the U.S. Navy, 
there was a 60% decrease in drug use in the early 1980s when it instituted mandatory 
drug testing for its employees (Borack, 1998, p. 17).  
Similar to drug testing, random polygraph testing to ensure compliance with 
regulations, has shown significant effects when individuals understand that there is an 
increased chance of detection and sanction (Borack, 1998; Strelan & Boeckman, 2006). 
Researchers noted that deterrence can be effective by increasing the number of random 
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tests on a larger population, as opposed to the mandatory testing of a large population 
(Abrams & Abrams, 1993; Apel, 2013; Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky, 
2003). The fear of detection of a crime is enough to cause social change because 
individuals may be subjected to a polygraph test (Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986; 
Weisburd Waring, & Chayet, 1995). 
 Polygraph testing is often used to detect the mishandling of classified information 
(Pozen, 2013). The Obama Administration directed the Director of National Intelligence 
to increase its review of polygraph questions concerning the mishandling of classified 
and placed an emphasis on leaks to the media (ODNI, 2012, 2015a). The goal is to deter 
and detect unauthorized disclosures (ODNI, 2012). 
 For polygraph to be an effective deterrent, employees must be aware of its use, its 
effectiveness, and the certainty of crime detection (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & 
Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983b). Pozen (2013) 
noted the historical failure of the Executive Branch to pursue leakers, despite statutes that 
allow for their prosecution. The author reported that leakers within the Executive and 
Legislative Branches are responsible for the vast majority of leaks. Research on criminal 
deterrence indicated that certainty of detection has a much greater deterrent effect on 
employees (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster et al., 
1983a). Other deterrent factors include individuals’ state of mind and their moral compass 
(Strelan & Boeckman, 2006). 
 Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model of corporate crime, 
Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model, and Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986) 
58 
 
SLT were used as the theoretical foundation in this study. While insider threats may be 
maliciously intended, some are attributed to negligence or ignorance of security polices 
(Herath & Rao, 2009). Herath and Rao (2009) found that employees’ perceptions about 
the severity of breach, response efficacy, and self-efficacy tend to have a positive effect 
on attitudes towards security policies. The researchers also found that social influence 
had a significant effect on compliance intentions and resource availability was a 
significant factor in increasing self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was found to be a significant 
predictor of policy compliance intentions. Employees’ organizational commitment played 
two roles by impacting intentions directly and promoted a belief that employee actions 
have an effect on an organization’s overall information security.  
In Chapter 2, I included the introduction, literature search strategy, theoretical 
foundation, background of polygraph testing, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 
1988, polygraph as a deterrent against security compromises, polygraph’s effect on 
employees’ behavior and attitudes, adhering to security regulations due to polygraph, and 
a summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the introduction, research design and 
rationale, methodology, data analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary. In Chapter 
4, I include the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a summary 
of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of findings, 
limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine 
whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between 
a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past 
year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the experience 
was more than a year prior to the distribution of the survey. I used a 15-minute 
researcher-developed questionnaire. Cluster sampling was used to select the sample of 
152 polygraph-treatment group and 174 no polygraph-treatment group (N = 326).  
Data analysis included t test and factor analysis. Data was analyzed using SPSS. 
The study was conducted in accordance with Walden University’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) guidelines to ensure the ethical protection of research participants. The IRB 
approved the application for the study and the approval number is 08-13-14-0118381. In 
Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, methodology, data analysis plan, 
threats to validity, and  a summary of the chapter. 
Research Design and Rationale 
A descriptive and exploratory research design was used. This research design was 
appropriate as the goal of the research study was to determine whether there was a 
statistically significant difference between the polygraph-treatment and no polygraph-
treatment groups’ perceptions of the deterrence effect of polygraph examinations. 
McNabb (2008) pointed out that descriptive studies “provide a description of an event or 
define a set of attitudes, opinions, or behaviors that are observed or measured at a given 
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time and environment” (p. 97). Participants in the polygraph-treatment group were 
employees who worked in the intelligence field and were subjected to random polygraph 
testing as part of their work. Specifically, I used participants who took a polygraph 
through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in South Korea 
and Fort Meade, Maryland. Participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were 
individuals who have never experienced a polygraph or the experience was more than a 
year prior to the distribution of the survey. They were recruited from the local vicinity of 
where I lived and worked in South Korea, the Walden University participant pool, and 
from the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn. 
 The method of data collection was a survey. Data on the surveys were collected 
through a 5-point Likert scale. A Likert scale is useful for data collection where I 
essentially collected ordinal data, but needed to interpret them as though the data were 
interval or ratio level data. The scale’s summative nature allows the individual perception 
of deterrent effects to be quantitatively displayed and compared to another group, and has 
been successfully used in past research on deterrence (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003). 
Researchers have found that increasing the certainty of detection of undesirable 
behaviors can have a deterrent effect on individuals engaging in those behaviors (Nagin 
& Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a). These 
researchers used a self-report method in their studies and noted the necessity of 
anonymity in exchange for truthfulness when assessing potential negative behaviors and 
attitudes, such as willingness to commit a crime in both the presence and absence of 
punishment and authority figures (Nagin & Pepper, 2012; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001, 2003; 
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Paternoster et al., 1983a). Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) noted that summative scales or 
perceptual surveys allow participants to better express their concern for sanction of risks 
prior to offending. 
The use of the Likert scale format was needed in this study in order to determine 
self-reported behavior and attitude changes. The Likert scale format allowed participants 
to express the likelihood of behavior and attitude change when exposed to a situation in 
which they are more likely to have violations of regulations detected through polygraph 
exams. Participants’ perceptions were important in determining polygraph’s deterrence 
effect against security compromises. Individuals with access to national security 
information and who are employed in law enforcement positions are briefed on a regular 
basis about their responsibilities in protecting national security and community standards, 
as well as the sanctions for failure to protect such information (National Research 
Council, 2003). Prior knowledge of potential sanctions increases deterrence since the 
rational actor can then consider risk versus gain (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003). Nagin and 
Pogarsky (2003) noted that sanctions must be known in order for the deterrence effects to 
be felt within the population. Likewise, the researchers noted that individuals knowing 
the sanctions and that there is an increased likelihood of detection deters negative actions. 
Most screening polygraph examinees are aware of restrictions placed on their access to 
sensitive information prior to their polygraph examination.   
Methodology 
 In this section, the methodology was discussed. Sufficient depth was provided so 
that other researchers can replicate the study. This section is organized in the following 
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subsections: population; sampling and sampling procedures; procedures for recruitment, 
participation, and data collection (primary data); pilot study; instrumentation; and 
variables. 
Population 
The sample consisted of 326 volunteer participants, all of whom were U.S. 
citizens or legal resident aliens located in South Korea and the United States. 
Demographics were not collected due to a guarantee of anonymity and demographics 
could have been used to identify likely volunteers. Originally, 372 individuals started the 
online survey, but 326 total completed the survey, with the no polygraph-treatment group 
having 174 participants and the polygraph-treatment group having 152 participants. The 
completion rate for the surveys once a participant had started was 88%. 
The 152 participants in the polygraph-treatment group were individuals who had 
recently taken a screening polygraph examination within the previous year and were 
currently in a position that required a polygraph as part of their job. They had taken the 
polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program, which has offices in 
South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 participants in the no polygraph-
treatment group were individuals who had not taken a screening polygraph examination 
in the last year and who were not required to take a polygraph as part of their job 
requirements. I used nonintelligence personnel in the local vicinity where I lived and 
worked in South Korea. In addition, students from the Walden University participant pool 
were used, of which 56 students received credit for attempting to complete the surveys. I 




Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
I conducted an independent cluster sampling from all participants. Cluster 
sampling refers to a sampling method that has the following properties: (a) the population 
is divided into N groups, called clusters; (b) the researcher randomly selects n clusters to 
include in the sample; (c) the number of observations within each cluster Mi is known, 
and M = M1 + M2 + M3 + ... + MN-1 + MN; and (d) each element of the population can be 
assigned to one, and only one, cluster (Stat Trek, 2015, para. 1). One cluster, the 
polygraph-treatment group, were individuals who had recently taken a screening 
polygraph examination within the previous year and were currently in a position that 
required a polygraph as part of their job. Annually, within the DOD, there are 
approximately 40,000 screening polygraph examinations conducted (DOD, 2009; 
National Research Council, 2003). There are, however, no openly available demographic 
or background data on individuals that typically receive a screening examination. 
Generally, polygraph offices are located within communities that have a high 
concentration of demand, such as placing a polygraph office near a large intelligence 
processing center or base (National Research Council, 2003). I am currently located in 
South Korea, so I recruited locally for both groups. I used the U.S. Army Intelligence 
Polygraph Program with offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland, as a source 
for the polygraph-treatment group.  
I recruited approximately 170 volunteers for the second cluster, the no polygraph-
treatment group. The second cluster of individuals were those who had not taken a 
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screening polygraph examination in the last year and who were not required to take a 
polygraph as part of their job requirements. Nonintelligence personnel were recruited 
from the local vicinity of where I lived and worked in South Korea, the Walden 
University participant pool, and the Walden University online community site, LinkedIn. 
The identities of individuals who participated in the study were not known due to 
anonymity attributed to the online survey. This sampling strategy was one of convenience 
due to the remote location of my  work site at the time in South Korea.   
 G*Power 3.1.7 was used to assess the required sample size for an independent 
sample t test. Using a medium effect size (d = 0.50), a generally accepted power of .80 is 
recommended when doing a t test for means (Sawyer, 1982); thus, a power level of 0.8 
was used, and an alpha level of .05, the required sample size is 128. For exploratory 
factor analysis in developing surveys, Field (2009) recommended at least 300 samples. 
Therefore, at least 300 (final results were N = 326) participants were needed to be used to 
have a large enough sample size to obtain significant findings. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection (Primary Data) 
 I completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Human Research Protections 
training prior to data collection. In addition, I complied with all U.S. federal and state 
regulations, which included informing participants about the level of confidentiality and 
anonymity in the study. I began data collection after receiving approval to conduct the 
study from the Walden University IRB.  
I received permission to conduct the study from a polygraph branch chief in the 
U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. For the polygraph-treatment group, I 
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recruited individuals who completed a polygraph examination from both the South Korea 
and Fort Meade, Maryland locations. I gave a hard copy consent form with the link to the 
survey to individuals who had completed a polygraph tests within the past year. 
Permission was also obtained from the branch chief to allow colleagues who 
administered the polygraph at either location to provide individuals who had completed a 
polygraph within the last year a hard copy consent form with the link to the survey. The 
consent form outlined participants’ anonymity in the study as there would be no way to 
identify who completed the survey (see Appendix A). The consent form outlined that no 
compensation was offered for their voluntary participation. The consent form also stated 
there were no connections between my study and their examination; therefore, they 
should not expect any preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in 
the study. Individuals who had pending polygraph examinations with me were excluded 
from taking part in the study in order to prevent a possible conflict of interest or 
perceived quid pro quo bias. 
For the no polygraph-treatment group, with the permission of program managers 
in the local vicinity where I lived and worked in South Korea, I recruited participants 
who did not require a polygraph test as part of their job requirement or individuals who 
did not complete a polygraph within more than a year prior to the distribution of the 
survey. In addition, students from the Walden University participant pool were recruited, 
of which 56 students received credit for attempting to complete the surveys. I also 
recruited and used individuals from the Walden University online community site, 




All participants were given a hard copy consent form with the survey link. The 
consent form was also available on Survey Monkey. Implied consent was used; therefore, 
the study replied on implicit endorsement rather than signed endorsement as participants 
were informed on the consent form that completing the web link survey indicated their 
voluntary consent to take part in the study. Participants completed the survey on Survey 
Monkey (see Appendix B for the questionnaire). The Survey Monkey account was set to 
ensure complete anonymity so that I could not identify individuals based on their 
responses. In order to ensure anonymity, no demographic information was collected. An 
advantage to using Survey Monkey was that it automatically saved the data into a form 
compatible with the SPSS. The initial collection of the data determined if the individuals 
were assigned to the polygraph-treatment or no polygraph-treatment group. All 
nonattributable digital data from the questionnaires are kept on removable media in a safe 
accessible only to me for a period of 5 years.   
Participants in the study may have access to the results now that the research is 
completed and approved. If participants want the results, they were instructed to send an 
e-mail request to me. My e-mail address was provided on the consent form. Due to the 
nature of the survey, it was unlikely that participation aroused any acute discomfort, such 
as psychological harm, economic loss, damage to professional reputation, and physical 
harm. 
Pilot Study 
 The term, pilot studies, refer to mini versions of a full-scale study, which is also 
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called feasibility studies, as well as the specific pretesting of a particular research 
instrument such as a questionnaire or interview schedule (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 
2001). Similarly, Leon, Davis, and Kraemer (2011) reported that the purpose of 
conducting a pilot study is to examine the feasibility of an approach that is intended to be 
used in a larger scale study. Pilot studies are used to improve the internal validity of a 
questionnaire (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001).  
Prior to the main study, I conducted a pilot study to test the reliability and validity 
of the questions on the survey, as well as the feasibility of implementing the data 
collection methodology. I collected at least 25 surveys in each of the polygraph-treatment 
and no polygraph-treatment group (no polygraph-treatment N = 56; polygraph-treatment 
N = 26). Once the surveys were electronically completed, the data from the survey were 
automatically uploaded into SPSS for evaluation. The reliability of the survey was 
determined by the use of the split-half method. I also conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis to determine factors related to deterrence and ran a Cronbach’s alpha to 
determine reliability of the questionnaire (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90). The SPSS was used 
to display the descriptive statistics of the range, skew, and the standard deviation.  
Instrumentation 
 The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed 
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived 
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs (see Appendix B). Researchers have 
used similar types of perception surveys in their investigation on deterrence (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). The questionnaire was divided into two 
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distinctly different sections.  The first section identified the participant’s group 
(polygraph-treatment or no polygraph-treatment), and included the informed consent 
information. No demographic data were collected except for participants’ polygraph 
experiences and whether or not their job required a polygraph. Therefore, no identifying 
data were collected. The second section of the survey contained the scaled questions 
along with definitions, which ensured a degree of consistency for certain terms used in 
the questions. A 5-point Likert scale format was used, ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree). Three items were reverse scored. The questions were developed to 
determine a participant’s self-reported likelihood of behavior and attitude change and 
perceptions of polygraph’s deterrence effects.   
In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from two 
agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help 
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA 
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the 
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure 
consistency with community standards. The list of questions were refined and reviewed 
for clarity. Any unclear or repetitive questions were reviewed and removed or reworded 
as necessary prior to progressing to the pilot study. Some words in the survey were 
specific to national defense; therefore, I wrote definitions that would clarify how the 
terminology would apply to both the polygraph-treatment and no polygraph-treatment 
groups. In an effort to prevent confusion on word use, review of the definitions was 
mandatory prior to proceeding to the survey on Survey Monkey. For example, words 
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such as security and espionage were included in the definitions to ensure proper 
understanding (see Appendix B).  
Variables 
 The operational variable was deterrence effect by means of self-reported 
perceptions of sanction risk to prior unlawful behavior or continuing acceptable behavior. 
The variable had two factors from which the questions on the questionnaire were derived: 
(a) admittance in a change of behavior and attitude and (b) belief of the effects of a 
change in the workplace security because of the use of the polygraph to ensure 
compliance. The creation of the questionnaire relied on the development of both factors 
once the factor analysis was completed.   
 The overall deterrence effect was determined by t test evaluations of the factors 
that resulted from the exploratory factor analysis, the results of the combination of 
various survey questions that best answered the research questions, and comparison of 
both groups with all questions evaluated using a t test with alpha set at .05. The scores 
were calculated by adding the sums of the answers from the Likert scale. Higher scores 
indicated an increased support for uses of the polygraph examination and self-reported 
change in behavior and attitude, which enhanced support of polygraph use.  
Data Analysis Plan 
 In this section I discussed the data analysis, which includes descriptive statistics 
and factor analysis. I also provided in-depth discussions of how each research question 
and hypotheses were analyzed. This section is organized in the following subsections: 




 In this section, I discussed the descriptive statistics used in the study. In addition, I 
discussed the factor analysis that was performed. This subsection is organized in the 
following areas: descriptive statistics and factor analysis. 
 Descriptive statistics. Data were analyzed using SPSS. Descriptive statistics 
were obtained to describe the research variables used in the analysis. These included 
means, standard deviations, and t tests.  
Factor analysis. A factor analysis was conducted among the 30 polygraph 
questions. A principal component analysis (PCA) was used. The PCA can be used to 
discover subsets of questionnaire questions that correlate with one another but are 
independent of another subset of correlated questions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). It was 
assumed that three factors would be produced: (a) adherence to security regulations, (b) 
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required, 
and (c) belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises. The 
factors were assumed to have no correlation with each other; thus, an orthogonal rotation 
was used in the loading matrix (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Items were considered 
strong loaders at .50 or better (Costello & Osborne, 2005)).  
 The number of factors extracted from the PCA were determined by examining 
eigenvalues and the scree test. The number of factors used were those that have 
eigenvalues greater than 1.00 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). In addition, the scree plot 
obtained was assessed for the slope of the decreasing eigenvalues. In addition, the Kaiser 
rule of eigenvalues greater than .70 for the communalities was assessed (Mertler & 
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Vannatta, 2010).   
 To conduct the principal components analysis, the assumptions of sample size, 
normality, and absence of outliers were assessed. In order to run the factor analysis, a 
large sample size should be used. MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, and Hong (1999) 
suggested at least 100 participants. This number can increase up to 500 if a very large 
number of items are used. With a total of 30 questions used in this study’s factor analysis, 
the general rule of thumb of 300 participants was a large enough sample to run the 
analysis (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Univariate normality among 
the items is also important for the analysis to run properly. Univariate normality was 
assessed using skew. A z score derived from skew and its standard error were used to 
assess for normality. For all z scores greater than ±1.96, the variable was significantly 
skewed and considered for removal from the PCA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Outliers 
were assessed for, defined as values greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean. 
 Once the PCA was conducted and factors were determined, a Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability testing was conducted on the factors. George and Mallery’s (2010) guidelines 
for reliability were used, where reliability greater than .90 is excellent, than .80 is good, 
than .70 is acceptable, than .60 is questionable, and less than .60 is unacceptable. Once 
good reliability was found for all factors, the summation of the factors was done to create 
the factor scores. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 In this subsection, I provided in-depth discussions of how each research question 
and hypotheses were analyzed. This subsection is organized in the following areas: 
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Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3. 
Research Question 1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to 
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of 
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to 
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment 
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by 
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
 To examine Research Question 1, I conducted an independent sample t tests to 
assess if there were differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (no 
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). The independent sample t test was the 
appropriate analysis to conduct with the goal being to assess statistical differences in a 
continuous dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In 
this case, the factor were based on the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment was the continuous 
dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent variable was group, with 
levels: no polygraph-treatment and polygraph-treatment. A t test was conducted for each 
adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An alpha level of .05 was 
used for the t test. 
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 The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis. 
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its 
standard error were used to assess for normality. For z scores greater than ±1.96, the 
variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not have 
a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for 
through the use of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch 
estimate for the t test was run instead, which does not assume equal variances.  
Research Question 2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of 
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no 
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
To examine Research Question 2, I conducted an independent sample t test to 
assess if there were differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph 
can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-
treatment). The independent sample t test is the appropriate analysis to conduct when the 
goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous dependent variable by a 
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dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case, the factors that were 
based on changing the behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered 
at work were the continuous dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent 
variable was group, with levels: no polygraph-treatment and treatment. A t test was 
conducted for each adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An 
alpha level of .05 was used for the t test. 
 The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis. 
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its 
standard error were used to assess for normality. For the z scores greater than ±1.96, then 
the variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not 
have a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for 
by the use of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch estimate 
for the t test was run instead, which does not assume equal variances. 
Research Question 3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a 
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 




Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment). 
To examine Research Question 3, I conducted an independent sample t test to 
assess if there were differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent 
against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-
treatment). The independent sample t test is the appropriate analysis to conduct when the 
goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous dependent variable by a 
dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). In this case, the factors that were 
based on the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises 
were continuous dependent variable of the test. The dichotomous independent variable 
was group, with levels: no polygraph-treatment and treatment. A t test was conducted for 
each adherence to security regulations factor found from the PCA. An alpha level of .05 
was used for the t test. 
 The assumptions of the independent sample t test were assessed prior to analysis. 
Normality was assessed by examining skewness. A z score derived from skew and its 
standard error were used to assess for normality. For z scores greater than ±1.96, the 
variable was considered significantly skewed and normality was not met (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2012). Although normality is an assumption, violations in normality does not have 
a large effect in type I error (Pallant, 2010). Equality of variance was assessed for by way 
of Levene’s tests. When equality of variance was not met, the Welch estimate for the t test 
was run instead, which does not assume equal variances. 
76 
 
Threats to Validity 
 In this section, I discussed threats to the validity of the survey. In addition, I 
discussed informed consent and ethical considerations. This section is organized in the 
following subsections: threats to validity of the instrument and ethical procedures. 
Threats to Validity of the Instrument 
 The survey design has many strengths, but it also has several weaknesses. In 
relation to this study, one of the possible validity threats of the survey design is that 
surveys are inflexible in many ways (Babbie, 2007). A 5-point Likert scale format was 
used and participants may be resistant to this format. Even though definitions were 
provided to help ensure full understanding of the questions asked, when filling out the 
surveys, participants may find some questions ambiguous. Since the survey was 
conducted through Survey Monkey, I was not present to provide additional information 
to participants. However, participants were provided with my contact information on the 
consent form in case they had any questions.  
Selection or sampling bias was an external threat to validity. In regard to selection 
bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received their 
screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment. However, 
participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections between 
the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any preferential 
treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Nonresponse bias is also 
another threat, which could have resulted in a low response rate on the survey and a 
decrease in the sample size, which could also affect the generalizability of the data. Some 
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surveys could not be used as some participants did not complete all the questions. 
However, there was enough participation to meet the sample size needed, where 300 
participants was the minimum and 326 individuals participated in the study. 
An internal threat to validity was the development of the survey and ensuring its 
reliability and validity. To address this threat, I used the assistance of experts in the field 
in developing my survey questions and conducted a pilot study before using the survey in 
the main study.   
Ethical Procedures 
The study was conducted in accordance with the parameters established by 
Walden University’s IRB to ensure the ethical protection of research participants. Hard 
copy consent forms were provided to participants during recruitment and an electronic 
consent form was also provided on Survey Monkey (see Appendix A). Participation in 
the study replied on implicit endorsement rather than signed endorsement. Participants 
were anonymous as no demographic data were collected. I did not knowingly recruit 
individuals from vulnerable populations. I also did not recruit volunteers under 18 years 
old and ensured that participants were U.S. citizens or resident aliens. I also excluded 
individuals who had pending polygraphs with me.  
The consent form outlined participants’ protections and the ethical guidelines I 
followed during the research project. The consent form included my contact information 
in case individuals had questions at any time before, during, or after the study. In 
addition, the consent form included the selection criteria for the study, outlined risks 
(physical or psychological) that the participants might experience, and participants were 
78 
 
informed that they were not obligated to complete any parts of the study with which they 
were not comfortable. In addition, the consent form outlined the anticipated benefits of 
the study, the lack of compensation, privacy information, disclosure of any potential 
conflicts of interest, and the contact information of the Walden University representative 
with whom they could privately talk about their rights as participants. Participants were 
also informed that all data will be kept on removable media in a safe accessible only to 
me for a period of 5 years.  
Summary 
In this study, I determined the perceived deterrent effect related to the use of 
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph 
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a 
polygraph examination within the same time period. There were152 participants in the 
polygraph-treatment group and 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group (N = 
326). Data were analyzed with a t test to determine whether there was a statistically 
significant difference between the groups. I also conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
to determine factors related to deterrence. Data were analyzed using the SPSS. 
The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed 
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived 
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs. A pilot study was conducted on the 
survey prior to the main study. All individuals were given a hard copy consent form with 
the survey link on Survey Monkey. The consent form was also available on Survey 
Monkey and implied consent was used. To ensure anonymity, no demographic 
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information was collected. All nonattributable digital data from the questionnaires are 
kept on removable media in a safe accessible only to me for a period of 5 years. 
Participants were provided with my contact information and the Walden University 
representative’s telephone number. 
In Chapter 3, I included the introduction, research design and rationale, 
methodology, data analysis plan, threats to validity, and a summary of the chapter. In 
Chapter 4, I include the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a 
summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction  
 In this study, I determined the perceived deterrent effect related to the use of 
polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph 
examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a 
polygraph examination within the same time period. Three research questions were 
examined. The first research question determined the differences between the two groups 
of adhering more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition 
of employment. The second research question determined the differences between the 
two groups in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly 
administered at work. The third research question determined the differences between the 
two groups in their beliefs that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security 
compromises. In Chapter 4, I present the pilot study, data collection and study results, 
and a summary of the chapter. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted in December 2014. The purpose of the pilot study 
was to determine the reliability of the questions on the survey and the feasibility of 
implementing the data collection methodology. I collected at least 25 surveys in each of 
the polygraph-treatment and no polygraph-treatment groups (polygraph-treatment N = 26; 
no polygraph-treatment N = 56). Based on Field’s (2005) guidelines, 82 was a relatively 
small number for conducting an exploratory factor analysis. The factor analysis, however, 
produced a six-factor solution. When examining factor loadings greater than .50, one 
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factor had only one question to it (Factor 5). I ran Cronbach’s alpha reliability testing on 
each of the factor solutions. Factors 1 – 4 had excellent reliability (>.90). However, factor 
6 had poor reliability (.40). Therefore, the pilot study produced four good factors to use. 
Below are the questions that relate to each factor: 
 Factor 1: q15, q18, q27, q28, q32, and q41 
 Factor 2: q16, q17, q24, q25, q26, q29, q31, q37, and q42 
 Factor 3: q34, q35, q45, and q46 
 Factor 4: q19, q20, q21, and q22 
Questions that could have been dropped from this list were q13, q14, q30, q33, 
q36, q39, q40, q43, and q44 because they cross-loaded or were present to detect 
answering bias and would not have been evaluated. I decided to retain all questions due 
to the inadequate number of survey questions for an adequate exploratory factor analysis. 
Only five of the proposed questions on the list could have been dropped because the 
remainder were present to detect answering bias in the survey and would not have been 
included in the final factor analysis. The methodology of collecting surveys was found to 
be sufficient for expanded use. If a volunteer made a mistake when filling out the survey, 
the Survey Monkey website would record a cookie that stated a survey had been 
completed. The volunteer could not open the survey again without clearing out the 
cookies. When soliciting volunteers, I had to provide each volunteer with instructions on 





Data Collection and Study Results 
 In this section, I discussed the descriptive statistics used in the study. I also 
discussed the factor analysis and the results of the study. This section is organized in the 
following subsections: descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and results. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Originally, 372 participants started the online survey and 326 individuals 
completed the survey. Therefore, the sample consisted of 326 participants, all of whom 
were U.S. citizens or legal resident aliens. There were 152 participants in the polygraph-
treatment group and 174 participants in the no polygraph-treatment group. Thus, the 
completion rate for the surveys once a participant had started was 88%. Participants were 
located in South Korea and the United States. Frequencies and percentages for nominal 
variables are presented in Table 1. Demographics were not collected due to a guarantee of 
anonymity and demographics could have been used to identify likely volunteers.  
Table 1 
Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables 
Variables n % 
   
Taken Polygraph in the Last Year   
No 174 53 
Yes 152 47 
   
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100. 
Factor Analysis 
 To assist in dimension reduction, I conducted a PCA on the 34 survey items. A 
PCA creates linear combinations of variables without assuming an underlying structure of 
83 
 
data (Suhr, 2005). PCA is commonly used when sample sizes are large, the variables are 
highly correlated, and the goal is to reduce the number of variables (Suhr, 2005).   
I assumed it would produce three factors (adherence to security regulations, 
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required, 
and belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises) and 
that the factors would not be correlated. Therefore, I used an orthogonal rotation in the 
loading matrix (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). However, the results on the initial PCA 
indicated a total of six components, similar in nature to the pilot survey. Upon further 
examination, the factor correlation matrix indicated that most factors were correlated at 
.32 or above. Based on Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2012) guidelines, any factors above .32 
should use oblique rotation methods. Therefore, the PCA was conducted again, 
implemented a manual constraint of three factors, and used direct oblimin rotation. The 
first three components had eigenvalues greater than one and cumulatively explained 59% 
of the variance. The scree plot in Figure 1 shows that the first principal component 




Figure 1. Scree plot for factor loadings. 
 The first factor consisted of 11 items, the second factor consisted of four items, 
and the third factor consisted of 12 items. The results of the PCA can be seen in Table 2. 
The items in each factor produced by the PCA are presented in Table 3. 
Table 2 
Eigenvalues of the Three Principal Components for Perceptions of Polygraph 
Examinations 
Principal Component Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % of 
Variance 
Comp. 1 15.46 45.46 45.46 
Comp. 2 2.70 7.93 53.39 







Items in Factors Produced by PCA for Polygraph Examinations Perceptions 
Factor 1 
 RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 RANDOM polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified 
information. 
 RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 RANDOM polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
 A RANDOM polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises. 
 Those subjected to RANDOM polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security 
regulations. 
 As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam. 
 People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam. 
 More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the Department of 
Defense. 
 I am willing to take a RANDOM polygraph exam as part of a security program. 
Factor 2 
 I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a 
MANDATORY polygraph exam. 
 I adhere more closely to security regulation because I am subjected to a 
MANDATORY polygraph exam on security regulations. 
 I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am subjected to a 
RANDOM polygraph exam on security regulations. 
 I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a 
RANDOM polygraph exam. 
Factor 3 
 I am willing to take a MANDATORY polygraph exam in order to enhance a 
security program. 
 People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a 
MANDATORY polygraph exam. 
 As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a MANDATORY 
polygraph exam. 
 A MANDATORY polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security 
compromises. 
 MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security 
compromises. 
                                                                                          (continued) 
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MANDATORY polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
 People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam. 
 Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program. 
 The results of a polygraph should not be used when making a security decision. 
(Reverse scored) 
 I would commit a security violation even if I was subjected to a polygraph exam. 
(Reverse scored) 
 Information on RANDOM polygraph examinations should be excluded from 
MANDATORY Threat Awareness briefings. (Reverse scored) 
  
 
 I examined the factors with regards to the research questions. It indicated that 
Factor 2 assessed adherence to security regulations and was appropriate to address 
Research Question 1. This factor contained four items, which were worded in a way that 
would be suitable for those that have recently taken a screening polygraph within the last 
year, those that have not taken a screening polygraph within the last year and did not need 
one for their current job (e.g., “I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am 
subjected to random polygraphs”), and those who have not taken a polygraph (e.g., “I 
would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were given a random polygraph”). 
Therefore, responses that were applicable for participants given categorization were used 
to create a composite score of two variables (security adherence due to random 
polygraphs and security adherence due to mandatory polygraphs). 
Because the other factors produced by the PCA did not directly assess the 
remaining research questions, I created new composite scores. A composite score for 
admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph test is randomly required 
(Research Question 2) was created from the mean of seven items and belief that a 




was created from the mean of seven items. These composites, and the items contained in 
each, are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Items in Composite Score for Perceptions of Polygraph Examinations 
Adherence to Security Regulations 
 I [would] adhere more closely to security regulations because I am [if I were] 
subjected to a mandatory polygraph exam. 
 I [would] adhere more closely to security regulations because I am [if I were] 
subjected to a random polygraph exam. 
 
Admittance of Behavior and Attitude Change 
 Those subjected to random polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security 
regulations. 
 As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a random polygraph 
exam. 
 People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a random 
polygraph exam. 
 More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the department of 
defense. 
 I am willing to take a random polygraph exam as part of a security program. 
 People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam. 
 Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program.   
 
Perceptions of Polygraph Efficacy 
 Random polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 Random polygraph exams can help prevent leaks of classified information. 
 Random polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 Random polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
 Mandatory polygraph exams can help detect deliberate security compromises. 
 Mandatory polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 Mandatory polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
  
 
To ensure that each of these composite scores had good internal consistency, I 
used a Cronbach’s alpha analysis for reliability. I used George and Mallery’s (2010) 
guidelines for reliability where reliability greater than .90 is excellent, greater than .80 is 
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good. I did not use any lower scores for reliability. The composite score for adherence to 
security regulations had excellent reliability (α = .92). The composite score for 
admittance to change of behavior and attitude likewise had excellent reliability (α = .90), 
and the composite score for belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent had excellent 
reliability (α = .92). The means, standard deviations, and reliability are presented in Table 
5. 
Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability for Composite Scores 
Variable M SD α No. of items 
Adherence to Security Regulations 3.29 1.17 .92 2 
Admittance of Change of Behavior and attitude  3.90 0.79 .90 7 
Effective Deterrent Against Security Compromises  3.76 0.81 .92 7 
     
 
Results 
 In this subsection, I discussed the results of the three research questions. The 
statistical analysis findings are organized by research questions. This subsection is 
organized in the following areas: Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and 
Research Question 3. 
Research Question 1. To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to 
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of 
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
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H01: There will be no difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to 
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment 
by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha1: There will be differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by 
group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
 To examine Research Question 1, I conducted an independent sample t test to 
assess if there were differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security 
regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (taken 
polygraph in past year: yes vs. no). The independent sample t test is the appropriate 
analysis to conduct when the goal is to assess for statistical differences in a continuous 
dependent variable by a dichotomous independent variable (Pallant, 2010). The 
composite score for adherence to security regulations was the continuous dependent 
variable and group (taken polygraph in past year: yes vs. no) was the independent 
variable. An alpha level of .05 was used for the test. 
 Prior to analysis, I assessed the assumption of normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test. 
The result of the test was significant, p < .001, indicating a violation of the assumption of 
normality. However, Howell (2012) suggests that the t test is robust despite violations of 
normality. The assumption of equality of variance was assessed using Levene’s test. The 
result of the test was not significant, p = .470, indicating the assumption of equality of 
variance was met.   
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 The results of the independent sample t test were not significant, t(324) = 0.55, p 
= .584, suggesting that there was not a statistically significant difference in adherence to 
security regulations by group. Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted and the 
alternative hypothesis was rejected. Results of the independent sample t test are presented 
in Table 6. Figure 2 shows the average score for adherence to security regulations by 
group. 
Table 6 
Independent Sample t Test for Adherence to Security Regulations by Group  
    No Yes 
Variable t(324) p  d M SD M 
       











Figure 2.  Adherence to security regulations by group (taken polygraph in past year). 
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Research Question 2. To what extent are there differences in the changing of 
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no 
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H02: There will be no differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
Ha2: There will be differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment). 
 To examine Research Question 2, I conducted an independent sample t test to 
assess if there were differences in admittance to change of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph test can be randomly administered by group (taken polygraph in the past year: 
yes vs. no). Prior to the analysis, I assessed the assumption of normality with a Shapiro-
Wilk test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of 
normality. However, Howell (2012) suggests that the t test is robust despite violations of 
normality. The assumption of equality of variance was assessed using Levene’s test. The 
result of the test was significant, p = .007, violating the assumption of equality of 
variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which does not assume equality of variance, was 
used (Stevens, 1999).   
 The results of the t test were significant, t(321) = -6.09, p < .001, suggesting that 
there was a difference in admittance to change of behavior and attitude by group. 
Participants who had not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower 
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than participants who had taken a polygraph in the past year. Based on Cohen’s (1992) 
guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a medium effect size. The 
alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was rejected. Results of the t 
test are presented in Table 7. Figure 3 shows the mean score for admittance to behavior 
and attitude change by group. 
Table 7 
Independent Sample t Test for Admittance to Behavior and Attitude Change by Group 
(Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No) 
    No Yes 
Variable t(321) p d M SD M 
       
Admittance to Behavior and attitude 
Change 
-6.09 .001 0.67 3.66 0.83 4.16 
 
 




Research Question 3. To what extent are there differences in the belief that a 
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-
treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? 
H03: There will be no differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment). 
Ha3: There will be differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment). 
 I conducted an independent samples t test to assess if there were differences in 
perceptions of polygraphs as effective deterrent to security compromises by group (taken 
polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no). Prior to analysis, I assessed the assumption of 
normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001, 
violating the assumption of normality. However, Howell (2012) suggested that the t test is 
robust despite violations of normality. The assumption of equality of variance was 
assessed using Levene’s test. The result of the test was significant, p = .008, violating the 
assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which does not 
assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).   
 The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(321) = -7.01, p < 
.001, suggesting that there was a difference in perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in 
deterring and preventing security compromises by group. Participants who had not taken 
a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a 
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polygraph in the past year. Based on Cohen’s (1992) guidelines, the difference between 
the two groups was a medium effect size. The alternative hypothesis was accepted and 
the null hypothesis was rejected. Results of the independent sample t test are presented in 
Table 8. Figure 4 shows the mean score for perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in 
deterring and preventing security compromises by group. 
Table 8 
Independent Sample t Test for Perceptions of Polygraphs Efficacy in 
Deterring/Preventing Security Compromises by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No) 
    No Yes 
Variable t(321) p d M SD M 
       
Perceptions of Polygraphs efficacy in 
deterring/preventing security 
compromises 
-7.01 .001 0.77 3.49 0.83 4.07 
 
 




Two of the three research questions had statistically significant results, which 
indicated a deterrent effect with regards to utility of a polygraph with those who had 
recently taken a polygraph examination within the last year. Specifically, for Research 
Question 2, the results indicated that there is a significant difference in the changing of 
behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group. For 
Research Question 3, results indicated that there is a significant difference in the belief 
that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group. On the 
other hand, for Research Question 1, findings indicated no significant difference in the 
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a 
condition of employment by group. However, when reviewing Research Question 1 
factors, it is interesting to note that those who have not taken a polygraph within the past 
year and do not require a polygraph as part of their current job were more likely to 
display a supportive attitude towards increased adherence to security regulations. In 
Chapter 4, I included the introduction, pilot study, data collection and study results, and a 
summary of the chapter. In Chapter 5, I include the introduction, interpretation of 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this descriptive and exploratory research study, I determined whether there was 
a perceived deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of 
participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year 
compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same 
time period. The instrumentation for this study was a 15-minute researcher-developed 
questionnaire that was used to obtain the perceptions of participants about the perceived 
deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs. This study was designed to answer 
three research questions: (a) To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to 
adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of 
employment by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment), (b) to what 
extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be 
randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-
treatment), and (c) to what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an 
effective deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
polygraph-treatment)? 
The results of the study indicated that there is a significant difference in the 
changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work 
by group. In addition, findings indicated a significant difference in the belief that a 
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group. On the other 
hand, findings indicated no significant difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely 
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to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the interpretation of findings, limitations of the study, 
recommendations, implications, and a conclusion to the study. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
In an effort to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related 
to the use of polygraphs, this descriptive and exploratory research study examined three 
research questions. The finding are interpreted in the context of the theoretical foundation 
and the literature review. This section is organized in the following subsections: Research 
Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3. 
Research Question 1 
To what extent are there differences in the likelihood to adhere more closely to 
security regulations if a polygraph is required as a condition of employment by group (no 
polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-treatment)? The results of the independent sample t 
test were not significant, t(324) = 0.55, p = .584, suggesting that there was not a 
statistically significant difference in adherence to security regulations by group. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted and the alternative hypothesis was rejected. 
 The research results revealed that individuals already subjected to a polygraph 
were not more likely to adhere more closely to security regulations as a result of being 
subjected to a polygraph examination. This finding may be attributed to the complacency 
within the Executive Branch in prosecuting security compromises (Pozen, 2013). Pozen 
(2013) noted that security compromises of classified information are very difficult to 
prosecute. Even though there have been over 100 successful prosecutions for espionage, 
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there are probably hundreds of security compromises of classified information every year 
to the media (PERSEREC, 2009; Pozen, 2013). Pozen highlighted that there are few 
successful prosecutions despite the huge number of leaks. This also relates to Bandura’s 
(1974, 1977, 1986) SLT as it takes into account individuals’ past experiences, which 
influences reinforcement, expectations, and expectancies (Boston University School of 
Public Health, 2013). All of these factors shape whether individuals will engage in a 
specific behavior and their reasons for doing so (Boston University School of Public 
Health, 2013).  
In addition, the lack of difference in adherence to security regulations between the 
two groups can also be interpreted in the context of Vance and Siponen’s (2012) rational 
choice model as organizational context factors could indirectly influence individual 
employees’ compliance intention, which is influenced by perceived benefits, formal 
sanctions, and security risks (Li et al., 2010). The effect of sanction severity was found to 
be moderated by personal norms (CITE). Similarly, in relation to Paternoster and 
Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model, Paternoster and Simpson noted that the 
decisions of employees are influenced by (a) the risks and benefits they perceive for 
themselves, (b) the risks and benefits they perceive for their company, and (c) the 
presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context 
of the organization. 
Research Question 2 
To what extent are there differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a 
polygraph can be randomly administered at work by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. 
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polygraph-treatment)? The results of the t test were significant, t(321) = -6.09, p < .001, 
suggesting that there was a difference in admittance to change of behavior and attitude by 
group. Based on Cohen’s (1992) guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a 
medium effect size. The alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
The research results revealed that participants who had not taken a polygraph in 
the past year or ever scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a 
polygraph in the past year. Therefore, individuals who are subjected to random polygraph 
testing are more likely aware of certain consequences to polygraph testing, such as 
detection and subsequent punishment (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 
2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986; Wright, 2010). The National Research 
Council (2003) noted that individuals who are subjected to polygraph testing will either 
resign to avoid the exam and subsequent interrogation, decide not to engage in a 
prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a particular agency altogether. For those subjected to 
polygraph testing on a regular basis in order to gain continued access to sensitive 
programs, the desired effect is that of continued adherence to rules, self-directed behavior 
and attitude change, or modification (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; 
ODNI, 2015a; U.S. Army, 1993). 
The significant differences in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph 
can be randomly administered at work by group can also be interpreted in the context of 
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model as employees who are subjected 
to random polygraph testing at the individual level may be more aware of the potential 
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costs of wrongdoing, such as the severity of formal sanctions, and other potential costs 
such as loss of occupational position; social censure from colleagues, family, and friends; 
personal embarrassment, and shame. In addition, the employees in the polygraph-
treatment group may be more dissuaded from offending if the organization or a staff 
member has recently been sanctioned for similar conduct or the company has 
organizational restraints such as an ethics hotline or random polygraph testing 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Furthermore, employees in the polygraph-treatment 
group may be more affected by normative factors such as their moral evaluation of 
wrongdoing (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). According to Paternoster and Simpson, 
employees may be restrained by moral inhibitions; therefore, some acts of corporate 
crime are not committed because they are believed to be wrong. 
Similarly, the findings can also be interpreted in the context of Vance and 
Siponen’s (2012) rational choice model as the polygraph-treatment group may have 
higher considerations for the severity of possible formal and informal sanctions, their 
moral beliefs, and perceived benefits, such as incentives, when considering policy or 
organizational violations. For example, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that only the severity 
of formal sanctions effectively reduced IS misuse. Bandura’s (1974, 1977, 1986) SLT 
can also be applied to the findings as employees in the polygraph-treatment group likely 
anticipated the consequences of their behaviors at a higher level than the no polygraph-
treatment group. Therefore, the polygraph-treatment group anticipated the consequences 
of their actions before they engaged in the behavior and these anticipated consequences 
influenced the successful completion of the behavior. In addition, the employees in the 
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polygraph-treatment group appeared to learn by observing what others do, consider the 
consequences that others experienced, rehearse (mentally first) what might happen in 
their own lives if they followed other’s behavior, take action by trying the behavior, 
compare their experiences with what happened to others, and confirm their belief in the 
new behavior. 
Research Question 3 
To what extent are there differences in the belief that a polygraph is an effective 
deterrent against security compromises by group (no polygraph-treatment vs. polygraph-
treatment)? The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(321) = -7.01, p 
< .001, suggesting that there was a difference in perceptions of polygraphs efficacy in 
deterring and preventing security compromises by group. Based on Cohen’s (1992) 
guidelines, the difference between the two groups was a medium effect size. The 
alternative hypothesis was accepted and the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The research results revealed that participants who had not taken a polygraph in 
the past year scored significantly lower than participants who had taken a polygraph in 
the past year. This finding may be attributed to employees in the polygraph-treatment 
group beliefs about its use, its effectiveness, and the certainty of crime detection. 
Research on criminal deterrence indicated that certainty of detection has a much greater 
deterrent effect on employees (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991, 1994; Nagin & Pogarsky, 
2001; Paternoster et al., 1983a). Therefore, employees in the polygraph-treatment group 
appear to be more aware that there are certain consequences to wrongdoing (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Paternoster et al., 1983a; Watson, 1986), 
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which could be detected by means of polygraph analysis. Wright (2010) noted that 
employees who leak information should be aware that there is an increased likelihood of 
detection and subsequent punishment. Therefore, employees who are subjected to 
polygraph testing will either resign to avoid the exam and subsequent interrogation, 
decide not to engage in a prohibited behavior, or simply avoid a particular agency 
altogether (National Research Council, 2003). Based on the findings, polygraph testing 
appears to have a deterrent effect on employees in the polygraph-treatment group who 
have access to sensitive programs. The desired effect of polygraph analysis is continued 
adherence to rules, self-directed behavior and attitude change, or modification (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1994; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; ODNI, 2015a; U.S. Army, 1993).   
 The findings can also be interpreted in the context of Paternoster and Simpson’s 
(1996) rational choice model, where the use of polygraph analysis is used to detect and 
deter wrongdoing. Paternoster and Simpson (1996) found that threats of criminal and 
civil sanctions directed against the individual inhibited the intention to commit corporate 
crime as well as the fear of informal sanctions. The threat of legal sanctions may be 
necessary to maintain the legitimacy of an extensive network of informal and normative 
controls. Similarly, Li et al. (2010) found that compliance intention will increase when 
employees perceive high threats from formal or informal sanctions. However, the 
researchers contended that theoretical models of corporate crime and public policy efforts 
must contain instrumental (threats of punishment) and deontological (appeals to morality) 
factors.   
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 The findings of my study can also be interpreted in the context of Bandura’s 
(1974, 1977, 1986) SLT, where employees vicariously learn about punishments from 
their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues, and social cues in the 
inhibitive learning process and becoming deterred from committing future fraudulent acts 
(Yiu et al., 2014). Subsequently, employees are at least minimally rational agents and 
their conduct is partly guided by the expected consequences of their behavior (Paternoster 
& Simpson, 1996). 
Limitations of the Study 
This study had several limitations. First, this study determined the perceived 
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between two groups; therefore, the study 
remained distinct in its focus and limited in its scope. This study was not designed to 
answer questions related to the validity, reliability, or accuracy rates of polygraph 
examinations. Although these topics may be important to public policy and 
administration field, psychology field, and the intelligence community, they were not the 
focus of this research effort.  
A second possible limitation of the study included generalizing the results since a 
cluster sampling of 326 participants, all of whom were U.S. citizens or legal resident 
aliens located in South Korea and the United States, was used and the results of the study 
are limited to similar populations of employees. The 152 participants in the polygraph-
treatment group had taken the polygraph through the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph 
Program, which has offices in South Korea and Fort Meade, Maryland. The 174 
participants in the no polygraph-treatment group were nonintelligence U.S. citizens and 
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legal resident aliens who lived and worked in South Korea, were students from the 
Walden University participant pool, and individuals from the Walden University online 
community site, LinkedIn. These employees’ unique perceptions may not be 
generalizable to other populations. 
Third, I used a 15-minute researcher-developed survey, which has not been used 
in past studies. However, a pilot study was conducted on the survey prior to using it in 
the main study. In developing the questions used in the survey, I received assistance from 
two agencies, the NCCA and the U.S. Army Intelligence Polygraph Program. To help 
establish the validity of the survey, a member of the research department of the NCCA 
and a retired polygraph examiner and former employee of the CIA also reviewed the 
survey questions and provided additional comments to the proposed questions to ensure 
consistency with community standards. In addition, the survey was found to have very 
high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = >.90). 
Fourth, selection or sampling bias was another limitation of the study. In regard to 
selection bias, since I am a polygraph examiner and some of the participants received 
their screening examination from me, participants may expect preferential treatment. 
However, participants were informed on the consent form that there were no connections 
between the study and their examination; therefore, they should not expect any 
preferential treatment as a result of their voluntary participation in the study. Future 
research could exclude participants who have taken a polygraph the researcher. In 
addition, changes to the populations could be made in future research, where more 
similar populations are compared. Specifically, two similar groups of participants who 
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work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within 
the last year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the 
experience was more than a year prior, could be compared and the results compared to 
the findings found in this study. 
A fifth limitation was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias could have resulted in 
a low response rate on the survey and a decrease in the sample size, which could also 
affect the generalizability of the data. Some surveys could not be used as some 
participants did not complete all the questions. However, there was enough participation 
to meet the sample size needed, where 300 participants was the minimum and 326 
individuals participated in the study.  
A sixth limitation was self-report or social desirability bias. Self-report or social 
desirability bias has to be considered as participants may want to be perceived positively 
so they may not respond honestly. In addition, there are problems inherent with self-
report data as participants may not accurately or fully self-evaluate themselves. In order 
to address this bias, the Likert scale format was used, which did not allow participants the 
freedom to include additional information that they may have felt was important. It was 
assumed that participants answered honestly to the questions asked on the survey. 
Recommendations 
Research Question 1 results revealed that individuals already subjected to a 
polygraph were not more likely to adhere more closely to security regulations as a result 
of being subjected to a polygraph examination. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
accepted and the alternative hypothesis rejected. Based on this finding, future research 
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could incorporate the perceptions of participants about the use of polygraph testing with 
other screening or investigative information that they have undergone to determine if a 
multifaceted approach would result in a significant difference between the groups in 
relation to the likelihood of adhering more closely to security regulations. For example, 
the American Polygraph Association (2005) discussed the use of polygraph results in 
conjunction with other screening or investigative information when making decisions. 
Jenkins (2013) suggested the use of mouse movement features that are diagnostic of 
deception for screening surveys. Paternoster and Simpson (1996) argued for a 
multifaceted approach to corporate crime control, such as the use of moral education 
(e.g., business ethics) and legal sanctions. Vance and Siponen (2012) suggested that 
organizations should include other means to discourage security violations apart from 
formal sanctions because they are not always effective in deterring policy violations.  
As discussed in the limitations of the study, to reduce sampling or selection bias, 
it is recommended that future studies exclude participants who have taken a polygraph 
from the researcher as participants may expect preferential treatment. In addition, another 
previously discussed recommendation was the use of similar populations between the 
groups that are being compared. Therefore, using two similar groups of participants who 
work only in the intelligence community, one group who require polygraph testing within 
the last year compared to those who either had never experienced a polygraph or the 
experience was more than a year prior. These results could then be compared to the 
results found in this study. 
In this study, demographic questions were excluded from the survey in order to 
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protect participants’ identities and ensure anonymity. However, while still ensuring 
anonymity, in future studies, researchers could collect limited demographic information 
that would not reveal participants’ identities, such as gender, race and age group. Then 
using these demographic data, additional analysis could be conducted to see if there are 
differences in the responses based on gender, race, and age.  
In future studies, researchers could further assess the validity and reliability of the 
survey instrument with similar populations as well as in other settings and culture. 
Similarly, researchers could also replicate the study using the same methods, but with a 
similar population, and in different settings and culture as well. The results of these 
studies could ensure that the results found in this study are valid and reliable, determine 
the role of extraneous variables, and inspire new research based on findings.  
Future research could also focus on modifying the survey’s 5-point Likert scale format to 
a 4-point Likert scale format by removing the neutral option. Researchers have suggested 
that when presented with a neutral response option, participants will be more likely to 
select that option than report their actual opinion (Bishop, 1987; Edwards & Smith, 2014; 
Johns, 2005; Kalton, Roberts, & Holt, 1980; Krosnick et al., 2001; Nowlis, Kahn, & 
Dhar, 2002). 
Implications 
Even though the findings for Research Question 1 indicated no significant 
difference in the likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph 
is required as a condition of employment by group, the findings for Research Questions 2 
and 3 were statistically significant. The findings indicated that there is a significant 
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difference in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly 
administered at work by group and there is a significant difference in the belief that a 
polygraph is an effective deterrent against security compromises by group.  
Based on these findings, there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use 
of polygraphs between the two groups. At the individual level, employees in sensitive 
positions who face random polygraph testing may take greater care to avoid even minor 
security infractions in order to avoid the possibility of a future deceptive reading on a 
polygraph test. At the policy and organizational levels, one of the goals of polygraph 
testing is deterrence, which means keeping employees, who have committed or may 
engage in wrongdoing, out of sensitive positions and keeping employees who are already 
in sensitive positions from doing undesired activities (National Research Council, 2003). 
The findings of Research Question 2 that random polygraph testing may result in a 
change of behavior and attitude is significant as it may deter actions that threaten national 
interests based on the perceived likelihood and consequences of detection. Therefore, the 
implications for positive social change stemming from these findings include 
recommendations to the nation’s national security agencies to continue enforcing the 
polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the 
possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national 
intelligence infrastructure.  
The findings for Research Question 1 indicated no significant difference in the 
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a 
condition of employment by group. Therefore, as noted in the recommendations section, 
109 
 
organizations should use multifaceted approach, where polygraph testing is used in 
conjunction with other screening or investigative information when making decisions. A 
multifaceted approach could include the use of polygraph testing, along with mouse 
movement features that are diagnostic of deception for screening surveys, moral 
education, and legal sanctions (American Polygraph Association, 2005; Jenkins, 2013; 
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Vance & Siponen, 2012). 
While there is an abundance of literature on the reliability and validity of 
polygraph analysis, this research study added to the literature by filling a gap in the 
public policy and administration literature with respect to employees’ perceptions about 
the deterrence effect of polygraph analysis. Findings from this study are beneficial not 
only to the public policy and administration field, but to a wide array of other fields, 
including the fields of psychology and intelligence. The findings from the study are also 
applicable to many agencies and organizations, to include the DOD and the coalition of 
17 agencies and organizations that are a part of the U.S. Intelligence Community 
including the ODNI, Army Intelligence, FBI, and CIA.  
Conclusion 
This study was undertaken in order to determine whether there was a perceived 
deterrent effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were 
subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have 
not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. Findings indicated 
a significant difference in the changing of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be 
randomly administered at work by group. In addition, findings indicated a significant 
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difference in the belief that a polygraph is an effective deterrent against security 
compromises by group. In contrast, findings indicated no significant difference in the 
likelihood to adhere more closely to security regulations if a polygraph is required as a 
condition of employment by group. 
Malicious insider threats pose a serious threat to organizations (Jenkins, 2013). 
Polygraph analysis is used as a deterrence to keep potential employees out of sensitive 
positions and keep current employees who are in sensitive positions from engaging in 
wrongdoing (American Polygraph Association, 2002; Jenkins, 2013; National Research 
Council, 2003; ODNI, 2012). Based on the findings, national security agencies should 
continue their enforcement of polygraph examinations that are required of certain 
security personnel. In addition, they should seek out other ways to expand polygraph 
analysis in order to strengthen the national intelligence infrastructure. This could include 
using a multifaceted approach that would include the use of polygraph testing in 
conjunction with other mitigation strategies and detection techniques, as well as other 
screening or investigative information (American Polygraph Association, 2005; Jenkins, 
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Appendix A: Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM  
You are invited to take part in a research study of Polygraph Deterrence. The researcher 
is inviting individuals in the following categories:  
a. Who have taken a screening polygraph within the last year AND are currently in a 
position that may require a polygraph test. Being in a position that requires a polygraph is 
identified by signing a statement of understanding that a person may be required to take a 
polygraph in the future as part of their job.  
b. Who have NOT taken a screening polygraph within the last year and are NOT in a 
position that may require a polygraph as a condition of employment.  
This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to understand this 
study before deciding whether to take part.  
This study is being conducted by Joshua Cook, a doctoral candidate at Walden 
University. You may already know or have met Mr. Cook during the course of your 
work. This study is not related to his current job and your participation in the survey will 
have no impact on your relationship with Mr. Cook. This study is wholly separate from 
his role in his current job.  
 
Background Information:  




If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:  
• Complete a questionnaire along with a brief statement on your polygraph 
experience. The questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes.  
 
Here are some sample questions:  
1. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a random polygraph.  
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree  
        5      4            3                        2                    1  
2. As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a mandatory polygraph 
exam.  
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree  
      5                   4                 3                          2                   1  
3. Random polygraph exams can help prevent espionage.  
Strongly agree Agree Neutral/No Opinion Disagree Strongly disagree  
5                       4                   3                          2                   1  
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Voluntary Nature of the Study:  
This study is strictly voluntary. Mr. Cook will be the only researcher involved in this 
study and he will respect your decision of whether or not you choose to be in the study. 
No one in the polygraph community will treat you differently if you decline to participate 
in the study. This study will NOT impact your occupation in the future and it WILL NOT 
impact your ability to receive a screening polygraph in the future. If you decide to join 
the study now, you can still change your mind during or after the study. You may stop at 
any time. The survey is completely anonymous. 
  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:  
Being in this type of study involves some minor risk of discomfort, similar to what would 
be experienced in daily life. An example would be recalling an unpleasant experience 
during a polygraph examination or being asked to choose between whether or not you 
agree or disagree with certain policies related to polygraph employment. Being in this 
study will NOT pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.  
 
The study is likely beneficial because it will assist in determining the impact having a 
screening polygraph program is for programs that use a polygraph to protect its 
proprietary or restricted information. It will also help determine how effective the policy 
in place is and will help provide a quantitative justification for continuation or change in 
the polygraph policy currently in place.  
 
Payment:  
There will be no payment offered for your voluntary participation.  
 
Privacy:  
Any information you provide will be kept confidential and will not be used in any 
government function. This study is NOT part of any government activity. All surveys 
will be anonymous and the data collected from the survey will be encrypted and 
maintained for 5 years, as required by the University. Mr. Cook will not use your 
information for any other purposes outside the study. He will also remove any identifying 
information from any information that may indicate the author of a particular survey.  
 
Contacts and Questions:  
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via email at Joshua.cook @ waldenu.edu. If you want to talk 
privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the 
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 1-
800-925-3368, extension 1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is 
08-13-14-0118381 and it expires on August 12, 2015.  
You may print a copy of this questionnaire for your records.  
Statement of Consent:  
 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
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decision about my involvement. Completing the web link survey indicates I voluntarily 





Appendix B: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
a. Have you taken a screening polygraph examination in the past 1 year? (Yes, see 
question b) (No, see question c). 
 
b. Approximately when did you take your polygraph exam? (Month/Year)  
 
c. Does your current employment position require you to take a polygraph as a condition 
of employment? (e.g., you have signed a form stating you might be required to take a 
polygraph as a condition of employment) (if yes, participant is not eligible. If no, 
participant is part of no polygraph-treatment group). 
 
d. Are you 18 years old or older (Y/N) What is the month/year of birth? 
 
e. Are you a U.S. person (green card holder/U.S. Citizen) (Y/N). 
Survey Definitions 
DISCLAIMER: For the purposes of the research, it is assumed that a perception of the 
polygraph is based on the need to take the polygraph as part of a person’s employment. 
Therefore, the definitions of mandatory and random may not be consistent with the 
definitions used in actual polygraph programs.   
 
Screening Polygraph: A screening polygraph exam is a generic polygraph examination 
with broad questions. The screening polygraph exam is non-accusatory and is not 
prompted by any specific incident or accusation.   
 
Mandatory Polygraph: A polygraph test that is taken on a predictable regular basis, 
typically conducted on a 5 year basis and called a periodic polygraph test. 
 
Random Polygraph: A polygraph test that is taken on an unpredictable basis.  An example 
of a random polygraph would be a polygraph taken at 12 months within the start of 
employment, then within 3 years of the last test, then 2 years later. Generally a random 
polygraph is not conducted in a predictable manner. Random polygraph exams can also 
be considered aperiodic tests.   
 
Security: Related to the individual responsibilities regarding protection and proper 
storage of proprietary or classified national defense information. The information is 
something an organization desires to hold close in order to protect organizational 
information, trade secrets, national defense information, etc. It is directly related to 
adherence of proper procedures in order to protect the information and prevent 
inadvertent or deliberate disclosures to unauthorized personnel. 
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Espionage: The providing of sensitive information to a competing power regarding 
organizational information, trade secrets or national defense information by a willing 
individual in order to give a potential advantage to the competing power. The providing 
of the sensitive information is often accompanied by reward to the provider of the 
information, which comes in the form of personal gain. 
 
Leaks: The unauthorized provision of sensitive information to members of the media, 
often done to damage the reputation of a party privy to the information or to gain an 
advantage in certain negotiations.   
 
Security program: A series of regulations and rules administered by a group of 
individuals with power to enforce and recommend sanctions for failure to adhere to 
regulations and rules. The purpose of the program is to protect sensitive organizational 
information, and to maintain an organization’s competitive edge when dealing with 
competing organizations.  
 
Deliberate security compromises: The deliberate violation of a security directive or rule, 
designed to protect a company’s information and maintain its competitive edge. 
Survey 
 
1.  As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
2.  As part of a security program, personnel should be subjected to a MANDATORY 
polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
3.  RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
4.  MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent espionage. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 




Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
6.  RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
7.  I adhere more closely to security regulations because I am subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam on security regulations. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
8.  I adhere more closely to security regulation because I am subjected to a 
MANDATORY polygraph exam on security regulations. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
9.  I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
10.  I would adhere more closely to security regulations if I were subjected to a 
MANDATORY polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
11.  Security will be enhanced if more people were subjected to a RANDOM polygraph 
exam 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
12.  Security will be enhanced if more people were subjected to a MANDATORY 
polygraph exam 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 




13.  More frequent polygraph exams can enhance the security of the Department of 
Defense. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
14.  Those subjected to MANDATORY polygraph exams adhere more closely to the 
security regulations. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
15.  Those subjected to RANDOM polygraph exams adhere more closely to the security 
regulations. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
16.  RANDOM polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
17.  MANDATORY polygraph exams can help prevent deliberate security compromises. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
18.  Polygraph exams are a necessary part of a security program. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
19.  A MANDATORY polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
20.  A RANDOM polygraph exam can help detect deliberate security compromises. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 




(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) -Taking a polygraph 
examination is an enjoyable experience. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
           
21.  People with a high level security clearance should be given a polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                           
 
22.  People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a MANDATORY 
polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
23.  People with a high level security clearance should be subjected to a RANDOM 
polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
24.  MANDATORY polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
  
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
25.  RANDOM polygraph exams can enhance workplace security. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                       
 
26.  I would commit a security violation even if I was subjected to a polygraph exam. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) -The results of a polygraph 
should not be used when making a security decision. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 




27.  RANDOM polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified information. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
28.  MANDATORY polygraph examinations can help prevent leaks of classified 
information. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) Information on RANDOM 
polygraph examinations should be excluded from MANDATORY Threat Awareness 
briefings. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
(question not evaluated, used to determine answering bias) A deliberate security 
compromise is OK. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
 
29.  I am willing to take a RANDOM polygraph exam as part of a security program. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 
    5                        4                                  3                       2                         1                
    
30.  I am willing to take a MANDATORY polygraph exam in order to enhance a security 
program. 
 
Strongly agree     Agree   Neutral/No Opinion   Disagree      Strongly disagree 




Appendix C: Survey Factor 1 and 3 t Test and Significance 
 
An independent samples t test was conducted to assess if there were differences in 
Factor 1 by group (taken polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no) (alpha = .95). Prior to 
analysis, the assumption of normality was assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result 
of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of normality; however, the t 
test is robust to violations of normality (Howell, 2012). The assumption of equality of 
variance was assessed using Levene's test. The result of the test was significant, p = .036, 
violating the assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which 
does not assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).   
 The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(324) = -5.21, p < 
.001, suggesting that there was a difference on Factor 1 by group. Participants who had 
not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who 
had taken a polygraph in the past year. According to Cohen (1988), the difference 
between the two groups was a medium effect size. Results of the independent sample t 
test are presented in Table 1.   
Table A1 
Independent Sample t Test for Factor 1 by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No) 
    No Yes 
Variable t(324) p  d M SD M SD 
        
Factor 1 -5.21 .001 0.58 3.60 0.83 4.05 0.71 
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 An independent samples t test was conducted to assess if there were differences in 
Factor 3 group (taken polygraph in the past year: yes vs. no;alpha = .89). Prior to 
analysis, the assumption of normality was assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk test. The result 
of the test was significant, p < .001, violating the assumption of normality; however, the 
t-test is robust to violations of normality (Howell, 2010). The assumption of equality of 
variance was assessed using Levene's test. The result of the test was significant, p < .001, 
violating the assumption of equality of variance; therefore, the Welch t statistic, which 
does not assume equality of variance, was used (Stevens, 1999).   
 The results of the independent sample t test were significant, t(313) = -9.04, p < 
.001, suggesting that there was a difference in Factor 3 by group. Participants who had 
not taken a polygraph in the past year scored significantly lower than participants who 
had taken a polygraph in the past year. According to Cohen (1988), the difference 
between the two groups was a large effect size. Results of the independent sample t test 
are presented in Table 2.   
Table A2 
Independent Sample t Test for Factor 3 by Group (Taken Polygraph: Yes vs. No) 
    No Yes 
Variable t(313) p d M SD M SD 
        
Factor 3 -9.04 .001 0.99 3.52 0.70 4.13 0.51 
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Appendix D: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables Combined 
 
Variables n % 
   
Question 1   
Agree 151 46 
Disagree 46 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 51 16 
Strongly agree 70 21 
Strongly disagree 8 2 
Question 2   
Agree 121 37 
Disagree 54 17 
Neutral / No Opinion 50 15 
Strongly agree 90 28 
Strongly disagree 11 3 
Question 3   
Agree 165 51 
Disagree 31 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 44 13 
Strongly agree 79 24 
Strongly disagree 7 2 
Question 4   
Agree 145 44 
Disagree 47 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 57 17 
Strongly agree 69 21 
Strongly disagree 8 2 
Question 5   
Agree 153 47 
Disagree 43 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 45 14 
Strongly agree 75 23 
Strongly disagree 10 3 
Question 6   
Agree 166 51 
Disagree 33 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 42 13 
Strongly agree 77 24 
Strongly disagree 8 2 
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Question 7   
Agree 55 17 
Disagree 53 16 
Neutral / No Opinion 146 45 
Strongly agree 37 11 
Strongly disagree 35 11 
Question 8   
Agree 60 18 
Disagree 50 15 
Neutral / No Opinion 140 43 
Strongly agree 43 13 
Strongly disagree 33 10 
Question 9   
Agree 111 34 
Disagree 65 20 
Neutral / No Opinion 69 21 
Strongly agree 56 17 
Strongly disagree 25 8 
Question 10   
Agree 105 32 
Disagree 69 21 
Neutral / No Opinion 70 21 
Strongly agree 57 17 
Strongly disagree 25 8 
Question 11   
Agree 169 52 
Disagree 33 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 52 16 
Strongly agree 68 21 
Strongly disagree 4 1 
Question 12   
Agree 153 47 
Disagree 39 12 
Neutral / No Opinion 65 20 
Strongly agree 63 19 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
Question 13   
Agree 154 47 
Disagree 32 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 59 18 
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Strongly agree 74 23 
Strongly disagree 7 2 
Question 14   
Agree 139 43 
Disagree 35 11 
Neutral / No Opinion 83 25 
Strongly agree 61 19 
Strongly disagree 8 2 
Question 15   
Agree 152 47 
Disagree 38 12 
Neutral / No Opinion 68 21 
Strongly agree 62 19 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
Question 16   
Agree 167 51 
Disagree 36 11 
Neutral / No Opinion 43 13 
Strongly agree 74 23 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
Question 17   
Agree 163 50 
Disagree 39 12 
Neutral / No Opinion 49 15 
Strongly agree 70 21 
Strongly disagree 5 2 
Question 18   
Agree 137 42 
Disagree 33 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 51 16 
Strongly agree 96 29 
Strongly disagree 9 3 
Question 19   
Agree 176 54 
Disagree 32 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 48 15 
Strongly agree 63 19 
Strongly disagree 7 2 
Question 20   
Agree 171 52 
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Disagree 30 9 
Neutral / No Opinion 47 14 
Strongly agree 72 22 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
Question 21   
Agree 33 10 
Disagree 93 29 
Neutral / No Opinion 140 43 
Strongly agree 9 3 
Strongly disagree 51 16 
Question 22   
Agree 119 37 
Disagree 16 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 31 10 
Strongly agree 153 47 
Strongly disagree 7 2 
Question 23   
Agree 111 34 
Disagree 20 6 
Neutral / No Opinion 48 15 
Strongly agree 138 42 
Strongly disagree 9 3 
Question 24   
Agree 120 37 
Disagree 25 8 
Neutral / No Opinion 44 13 
Strongly agree 128 39 
Strongly disagree 9 3 
Question 25   
Agree 153 47 
Disagree 29 9 
Neutral / No Opinion 79 24 
Strongly agree 58 18 
Strongly disagree 7 2 
Question 26   
Agree 156 48 
Disagree 31 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 58 18 
Strongly agree 75 23 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
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Question 27   
Agree 16 5 
Disagree 77 24 
Neutral / No Opinion 33 10 
Strongly agree 4 1 
Strongly disagree 196 60 
Question 28   
Agree 53 16 
Disagree 136 42 
Neutral / No Opinion 87 27 
Strongly agree 11 3 
Strongly disagree 39 12 
Question 29   
Agree 163 50 
Disagree 41 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 49 15 
Strongly agree 67 21 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
Question 30   
Agree 156 48 
Disagree 44 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 59 18 
Strongly agree 63 19 
Strongly disagree 4 1 
Question 31   
Agree 62 19 
Disagree 95 29 
Neutral / No Opinion 129 40 
Strongly agree 14 4 
Strongly disagree 26 8 
Question 32   
Agree 12 4 
Disagree 50 15 
Neutral / No Opinion 21 6 
Strongly agree 2 1 
Strongly disagree 241 74 
Question 33   
Agree 154 47 
Disagree 16 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 36 11 
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Strongly agree 107 33 
Strongly disagree 13 4 
Question 34   
Agree 143 44 
Disagree 20 6 
Neutral / No Opinion 31 10 
Strongly agree 117 36 
Strongly disagree 15 5 
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100. 
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Appendix E: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables Yes polygraph 
 
Variables n % 
Question 1   
Agree 70 46 
Disagree 8 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 25 16 
Strongly agree 46 30 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
Question 2   
Agree 58 38 
Disagree 6 4 
Neutral / No Opinion 20 13 
Strongly agree 66 43 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 3   
Agree 71 47 
Disagree 5 3 
Neutral / No Opinion 18 12 
Strongly agree 57 38 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 4   
Agree 75 49 
Disagree 4 3 
Neutral / No Opinion 21 14 
Strongly agree 51 34 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 5   
Agree 72 47 
Disagree 3 2 
Neutral / No Opinion 19 13 
Strongly agree 55 36 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
Question 6   
Agree 70 46 
Disagree 5 3 
Neutral / No Opinion 19 13 
Strongly agree 56 37 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 7   
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Agree 32 21 
Disagree 31 20 
Neutral / No Opinion 51 34 
Strongly agree 26 17 
Strongly disagree 12 8 
Question 8   
Agree 36 24 
Disagree 27 18 
Neutral / No Opinion 45 30 
Strongly agree 32 21 
Strongly disagree 12 8 
Question 9   
Agree 37 24 
Disagree 29 19 
Neutral / No Opinion 46 30 
Strongly agree 30 20 
Strongly disagree 10 7 
Question 10   
Agree 42 28 
Disagree 30 20 
Neutral / No Opinion 43 28 
Strongly agree 27 18 
Strongly disagree 10 7 
Question 11   
Agree 71 47 
Disagree 8 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 17 
Strongly agree 46 30 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 12   
Agree 76 50 
Disagree 7 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 18 
Strongly agree 40 26 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 13   
Agree 69 45 
Disagree 8 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 18 
Strongly agree 47 31 
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Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 14   
Agree 67 44 
Disagree 12 8 
Neutral / No Opinion 36 24 
Strongly agree 35 23 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 15   
Agree 64 42 
Disagree 14 9 
Neutral / No Opinion 37 24 
Strongly agree 36 24 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 16   
Agree 72 47 
Disagree 9 6 
Neutral / No Opinion 22 14 
Strongly agree 48 32 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 17   
Agree 77 51 
Disagree 9 6 
Neutral / No Opinion 19 13 
Strongly agree 46 30 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 18   
Agree 62 41 
Disagree 3 2 
Neutral / No Opinion 14 9 
Strongly agree 72 47 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 19   
Agree 88 58 
Disagree 3 2 
Neutral / No Opinion 16 11 
Strongly agree 44 29 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 20   
Agree 76 50 
Disagree 5 3 
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Neutral / No Opinion 20 13 
Strongly agree 50 33 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 21   
Agree 27 18 
Disagree 45 30 
Neutral / No Opinion 58 38 
Strongly agree 8 5 
Strongly disagree 14 9 
Question 22   
Agree 51 34 
Disagree 1 1 
Neutral / No Opinion 8 5 
Strongly agree 90 59 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 23   
Agree 49 32 
Disagree 3 2 
Neutral / No Opinion 12 8 
Strongly agree 86 57 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Question 24   
Agree 49 32 
Disagree 5 3 
Neutral / No Opinion 20 13 
Strongly agree 75 49 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
Question 25   
Agree 76 50 
Disagree 4 3 
Neutral / No Opinion 31 20 
Strongly agree 40 26 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 26   
Agree 70 46 
Disagree 6 4 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 18 
Strongly agree 48 32 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 27   
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Agree 7 5 
Disagree 26 17 
Neutral / No Opinion 10 7 
Strongly agree 2 1 
Strongly disagree 107 70 
Question 28   
Agree 13 9 
Disagree 71 47 
Neutral / No Opinion 44 29 
Strongly agree 3 2 
Strongly disagree 21 14 
Question 29   
Agree 76 50 
Disagree 9 6 
Neutral / No Opinion 22 14 
Strongly agree 44 29 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 30   
Agree 72 47 
Disagree 8 5 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 17 
Strongly agree 45 30 
Strongly disagree 1 1 
Question 31   
Agree 24 16 
Disagree 48 32 
Neutral / No Opinion 55 36 
Strongly agree 10 7 
Strongly disagree 15 10 
Question 32   
Agree 4 3 
Disagree 13 9 
Neutral / No Opinion 2 1 
Strongly disagree 133 88 
Question 33   
Agree 70 46 
Disagree 2 1 
Neutral / No Opinion 7 5 
Strongly agree 70 46 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
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Question 34   
Agree 65 43 
Disagree 2 1 
Neutral / No Opinion 3 2 
Strongly agree 80 53 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100. 
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Appendix F: Frequencies and Percentages for Nominal Variables No Polygraph Group 
 
Variables n % 
   
Question 1   
Agree 81 47 
Disagree 38 22 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 15 
Strongly agree 24 14 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 2   
Agree 63 36 
Disagree 48 28 
Neutral / No Opinion 30 17 
Strongly agree 24 14 
Strongly disagree 9 5 
Question 3   
Agree 94 54 
Disagree 26 15 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 15 
Strongly agree 22 13 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 4   
Agree 70 40 
Disagree 43 25 
Neutral / No Opinion 36 21 
Strongly agree 18 10 
Strongly disagree 7 4 
Question 5   
Agree 81 47 
Disagree 40 23 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 15 
Strongly agree 20 11 
Strongly disagree 7 4 
Question 6   
Agree 96 55 
Disagree 28 16 
Neutral / No Opinion 23 13 
Strongly agree 21 12 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
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Question 7   
Agree 23 13 
Disagree 22 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 95 55 
Strongly agree 11 6 
Strongly disagree 23 13 
Question 8   
Agree 24 14 
Disagree 23 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 95 55 
Strongly agree 11 6 
Strongly disagree 21 12 
Question 9   
Agree 74 43 
Disagree 36 21 
Neutral / No Opinion 23 13 
Strongly agree 26 15 
Strongly disagree 15 9 
Question 10   
Agree 63 36 
Disagree 39 22 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 16 
Strongly agree 30 17 
Strongly disagree 15 9 
Question 11   
Agree 98 56 
Disagree 25 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 26 15 
Strongly agree 22 13 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
Question 12   
Agree 77 44 
Disagree 32 18 
Neutral / No Opinion 38 22 
Strongly agree 23 13 
Strongly disagree 4 2 
Question 13   
Agree 85 49 
Disagree 24 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 32 18 
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Strongly agree 27 16 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 14   
Agree 72 41 
Disagree 23 13 
Neutral / No Opinion 47 27 
Strongly agree 26 15 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 15   
Agree 88 51 
Disagree 24 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 31 18 
Strongly agree 26 15 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 16   
Agree 95 55 
Disagree 27 16 
Neutral / No Opinion 21 12 
Strongly agree 26 15 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 17   
Agree 86 49 
Disagree 30 17 
Neutral / No Opinion 30 17 
Strongly agree 24 14 
Strongly disagree 4 2 
Question 18   
Agree 75 43 
Disagree 30 17 
Neutral / No Opinion 37 21 
Strongly agree 24 14 
Strongly disagree 8 5 
Question 19   
Agree 88 51 
Disagree 29 17 
Neutral / No Opinion 32 18 
Strongly agree 19 11 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 20   
Agree 95 55 
154 
 
Disagree 25 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 16 
Strongly agree 22 13 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 21   
Agree 6 3 
Disagree 48 28 
Neutral / No Opinion 82 47 
Strongly agree 1 1 
Strongly disagree 37 21 
Question 22   
Agree 68 39 
Disagree 15 9 
Neutral / No Opinion 23 13 
Strongly agree 63 36 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 23   
Agree 62 36 
Disagree 17 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 36 21 
Strongly agree 52 30 
Strongly disagree 7 4 
Question 24   
Agree 71 41 
Disagree 20 11 
Neutral / No Opinion 24 14 
Strongly agree 53 30 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 25   
Agree 77 44 
Disagree 25 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 48 28 
Strongly agree 18 10 
Strongly disagree 6 3 
Question 26   
Agree 86 49 
Disagree 25 14 
Neutral / No Opinion 31 18 
Strongly agree 27 16 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
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Question 27   
Agree 9 5 
Disagree 51 29 
Neutral / No Opinion 23 13 
Strongly agree 2 1 
Strongly disagree 89 51 
Question 28   
Agree 40 23 
Disagree 65 37 
Neutral / No Opinion 43 25 
Strongly agree 8 5 
Strongly disagree 18 10 
Question 29   
Agree 87 50 
Disagree 32 18 
Neutral / No Opinion 27 16 
Strongly agree 23 13 
Strongly disagree 5 3 
Question 30   
Agree 84 48 
Disagree 36 21 
Neutral / No Opinion 33 19 
Strongly agree 18 10 
Strongly disagree 3 2 
Question 31   
Agree 38 22 
Disagree 47 27 
Neutral / No Opinion 74 43 
Strongly agree 4 2 
Strongly disagree 11 6 
Question 32   
Agree 8 5 
Disagree 37 21 
Neutral / No Opinion 19 11 
Strongly agree 2 1 
Strongly disagree 108 62 
Question 33   
Agree 84 48 
Disagree 14 8 
Neutral / No Opinion 29 17 
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Strongly agree 37 21 
Strongly disagree 10 6 
Question 34   
Agree 78 45 
Disagree 18 10 
Neutral / No Opinion 28 16 
Strongly agree 37 21 
Strongly disagree 13 7 
Note. Due to rounding error, percentages may not add up to 100. 
 
 
 
 
